THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT IN MAJORITY

Abstract

This research paper investigates the profound shifts in administrative dynamics, bureaucratic autonomy, and governance outcomes when a government enjoys a clear and stable legislative majority—a "Government in Majority." Utilizing a comparative-institutional approach, the study posits that majority governments, while possessing the political capital to undertake large-scale, difficult structural reforms and ensure swift policy implementation, also pose distinct risks to administrative neutrality and institutional checks and balances. The analysis focuses on three critical areas: the centralization of decision-making within the political executive (e.g., the Prime Minister's Office/Cabinet), the erosion of bureaucratic autonomy due to increased political interference, and the impact on institutional accountability (e.g., the role of the Legislature and anti-corruption bodies). Findings suggest that administrative effectiveness under a strong majority is characterized by both enhanced speed and efficiency, particularly in policy execution, and a heightened vulnerability to the politicization of the civil services, necessitating robust internal safeguards and external accountability mechanisms to preserve democratic integrity.