RESEARCH ON THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS AND ANTI-MONOPOLY GOVERNANCE PATH OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES IN PLATFORM ECONOMY

Abstract

In the current thriving digital economy, the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses in digital platforms have become a hot topic in antitrust law, but there are many controversies regarding their competitive effects. When determining whether MFN clauses constitute anti-competitive behavior, it is difficult to prove collusion or abuse of market dominance, and the unique agency model is affected by the traditional 'agency exception' rule in the determination of monopoly agreements. In recent years, MFN clauses have also begun to be applied in China's digital platforms, posing potential risks to platform market competition in China. However, China's current antitrust laws have an imperfect regulatory framework for such clauses. This paper focuses on the antitrust regulation of MFN clauses in digital platforms, conducting an in-depth study to analyze their competitive harm theory and regulatory challenges, particularly the evidentiary difficulties in proving anti-competitive behavior and issues related to the agency principle. Meanwhile, it reviews relevant antitrust regulatory practices abroad, combines China's actual situation, and suggests that China should adopt a cautious attitude when regulating platform MFN clauses, strengthen economic analysis oriented towards competitive effects, thereby fulfilling market supervision responsibilities, stimulating platform innovation, and fostering a good competitive ecosystem for the digital economy.