

UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST RECRUITMENT: LENSES OF PROTECTION, LURING THE LOST, AND PROMISED BELONGING

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Abstract

This study examine the effect of individuals' attitudes toward extremist groups, their own behaviors, and their daily exposure to hate speech. A quantitative survey method is used and collected data from a total of 141 participants. The average age of the respondents is 35.5 years old, and the male-to-female ratio is nearly balanced: 54% are male and 46% are female. Participants spend an average of 3.2 hours per day using the general internet, and 3.6 hours per day on social media platforms—time spent on social platforms is even longer. In terms of educational background, nearly half of the participants hold a bachelor's degree, another 25% have completed high school. This survey was distributed via social platforms and Google Forms. The questions in the questionnaire were designed using a Likert scale, offers space to select the degree of agreement, such as strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Data analyzed using SPSS.

The ANOVA for the regression model was significant ($F = 26.346$, $\alpha = 0.000$), which shows that attitudes, behavior, and exposure to hate speech significantly impact how much people are attracted to extremist groups. Both attitudes and exposure to hate speech were strong positive predictors with high statistical significance ($p < .001$ and $p = .018$, respectively). The zero-order correlation for attitudes ($r = .582$) shows a strong, direct link to attraction. Furthermore, partial and part correlations demonstrate how much attitudes contribute to the model even when other variables are accounted for. Similarly, exposure to hate speech showed a significant zero-order correlation ($r = .399$) and a significant partial correlation effect. The study confirmed that an individual's ideological orientation and exposure to hate speech are primary drivers in developing favorable attitudes toward extremism. Furthermore, individual behaviors were not significant predictors, indicating a more complex relationship. The research advocates for targeted educational programs and policy measures, tailored to Qatar's cultural context, to guide responsible online behavior and reduce extremist recruitment. This approach aims to effectively curb the influence of extremist ideologies.

KEYWORDS: favorability toward extremist ideologies, psychological and social factors, individual ideology, individual behavior, exposure to hate speech, extremist organization recruitment

INTRODUCTION

Extremist recruitment has changed globally, with groups using sophisticated psychological and social manipulation to pull people in (Smith & Jones, 2023). Understanding these methods is vital for creating effective counter-extremism strategies in Qatar. This study, *Luring the Lost: Understanding Extremist Recruitment through the Lenses of Protection, Propaganda, and Promised Belonging*, aims to uncover how extremist groups target the vulnerable. Recent research suggests that recruitment is often psychological; groups often frame themselves as rescuers of the oppressed and use emotionally charged propaganda to fuel anger and hatred (Lee et al., 2022; Patel & Kumar, 2021). These organizations offer a sense of belonging and exploit personal grievances or perceived failures to attract members (Patel & Kumar, 2021). Additionally, material incentives and the secretive nature of digital indoctrination play a role in their appeal (Lee et al., 2022).

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organizations offer a sense of belonging and exploit personal grievances or perceived failures to attract members (Patel & Kumar, 2021). Additionally, material incentives and the secretive nature of digital indoctrination play a role in their appeal (Lee et al., 2022).

This paper intends to study the various tactics used by extremist organizations to recruit ordinary people into their ranks, and all analyses are strictly restricted to Qatar's unique sociopolitical context, with no reference to conditions in other regions. Qatar has seen an astonishingly rapid pace of modernization in recent years, with new lifestyles and social norms emerging constantly; these new developments often collide irreconcilably with the local traditional values that have been passed down for hundreds of years among local generations (Johnson & Ray, 2021). The core objective of this study is to comprehensively map all possible paths through which ordinary individuals gradually slip into radicalization. Specifically, we will clarify three key questions one by one: what extreme ideologies an otherwise normal ordinary person might develop, what unconventional, deviant behaviors they might engage in, and through what channels they first accessed content that promotes the agendas of extremist organizations. We hope the conclusions drawn from this study can assist two groups: first, government officials responsible for formulating national policies, and second, leaders of local communities, enabling them to design counter-extremism programs that align with Qatar's local cultural norms on the basis of these findings. Programs developed along these lines will not fail to implement due to being incompatible with local culture and will effectively halt the spread of extremism in this region (Martin et al., 2023).

Academic research on the radicalization process has accumulated quite sufficiently. Researchers reached a consensus on a conclusion very early on, and this conclusion is largely uncontroversial, recognized by all relevant scholars. That is, extremist groups can never successfully recruit new members relying solely on an isolated incident. An ordinary person will gradually move toward radicalization, and the underlying deep-rooted causes behind this process are themselves extremely complex. It is absolutely impossible for a single event completely disconnected from all other circumstances to draw a person into an extremist group.

The radicalization that actually occurs in individuals is never fixed; it is a continuously advancing and constantly changing process that must go through a series of interlinked distinct stages before it fully takes shape. Throughout this entire process, extremist groups will accurately identify and address the unmet psychological needs of each individual, while simultaneously instilling a pre-constructed, logically consistent narrative that gradually lures people into their traps.

This review synthesizes all empirical evidence previously collected through field investigations and observations and systematically sorts out the complete chain of actions of these groups from beginning to end: how they initially recruit new members, how they gradually transform an ordinary person into an extremist like themselves during the intermediate stage, and finally how they mobilize these newly recruited individuals to carry out pre-planned extremist acts.

The Psychological Role of Grievance and Victimhood Narratives

When extremist groups seek to recruit new members, the first narrative they instill in their targets is typically that "our group is a victim of oppression." Through this narrative, they gradually construct an adversarial "us versus them" perception: you are not aligned with those outside groups, and only by joining us are you on the right side. With this strategy, they firmly tie their own desired goals to the moral outrage of "the situation is unfair" that emerges in the minds of those hearing the narrative. At the same time, they frame their violent acts, such as killing and arson, as self-defense forced upon them by desperate circumstances, rather than them actively choosing to harm others. Cottee and Hayward (2011) specifically defined this practice as "the moralization of violence"—individuals who eventually carry out extremist acts sincerely believe their actions are a heroic choice to stand up against systemic injustice in society. This definition is further supported by the "Staircase to Terrorism" model proposed by scholar Moghaddam (2005), which identifies the emergence of a perceived sense of societal injustice as a core turning point for an individual to embark on a path of extremism. If formal social institutions and community organizations fail to detect these emotions in a timely manner and properly alleviate them, an unaddressed gap will emerge. Extremists will immediately exploit this gap, reframing violence as a morally imperative choice and fully pulling disgruntled individuals into the quagmire of extremism.

In addition to recruiting people through ideology, the methods extremist organizations use to draw people into their ranks also seize on two fundamental needs in ordinary people's hearts: one is the desire to make one's life valuable and meaningful, and the other is the wish to find a group that can accept them and truly integrate into.

Not everyone. These methods do not easily lead everyone. by these methods. One category of people has particularly weak defenses: those who are experiencing major life changes. They often end up in this situation because they have been sidelined and marginalized by mainstream groups or have encountered setbacks in life and faced insurmountable personal failures; this group has an exceptionally high acceptance of extremist ideologies (Kruglanski et al., 2014).

This pattern is not put forward arbitrarily and is supported by psychological theory, namely, the uncertainty-identity theory. This theory suggests that individuals who experience significant uncertainty regarding their self-cognition, such as questioning their identity and future direction, are likely to be drawn to their self-cognition, such as "What

kind of person am I?" and "Where am I heading in the future?" and will be strongly attracted by the rigid, black-and-white worldview of extremist organizations (Hogg, 2014).

For these new members who have just been drawn into the organization, the group is no longer merely a collective for mutual comfort—it is more like a replacement family that fills the gap. In their previous lives, they could not achieve a sense of belonging or gain recognition; after joining the organization, all these needs are satisfied. They can obtain social recognition from everyone in the group and regain a steady, certain sense of security during the most turbulent and confused period of their lives.

Digital Propaganda and Closed Environments

The advent of the Internet era has completely rewritten the operation of extremist organizations' recruitment efforts, which is entirely different from the old approach of the past, where they could only locate people offline and carry out slow infiltration.

Now, one of their core strategies to recruit people is to distribute visual propaganda content, such as releasing photos of co-ethnic or co-religious believers suffering (Klausen, 2015). Through these images with strong emotional impact, they stir up the emotions of viewers and forcibly ignite people's anger.

In addition to emotionally charged propaganda materials, the characteristics of online space itself. They also exploit the characteristics of online space, in addition to emotionally charged propaganda materials. by them. Many online environments become echo chambers (von Behr et al., 2013)—simply put, in this small circle, everyone only repeatedly hears ideas that align with their own and cannot come into contact with any dissenting opinions, so their original beliefs are constantly reinforced.

The changes brought about by this environment cause the entire recruitment process to shift from people passively encountering extremist content to actively immersing themselves in private, closed spaces to participate, becoming increasingly engaged and deeply trapped the more they interact.

The recruiters also take advantage of the situation by transferring these potential members, who have already been swayed, to encrypted, independent communication channels that outsiders cannot access, where only members of the organization can converse with each other.

This step completely strips these people away from mainstream, ordinary cognition. In the small circle, a hyper-real environment detached from reality is created, which greatly accelerates the speed at which extremist ideologies are instilled in them (Berger, 2016).

The Value of Violence and Incentives

Finally, there is another critical incentive: the empty promises made by the organization, which offer either a superior social status or tangible material benefits. These two factors are often the core driving forces that push people who initially only observed to stand up and actively participate in activities on their own. These recruitment-focused radical organizations package martyrdom, the act of sacrificing oneself for the organization, as the most extraordinary heroic act in the world—as long as one commits this act, they will gain honor that no one else can obtain, and their name will be permanently etched into the organization's history, leaving a lifelong legacy. These benefits are completely out of reach for the young people seeking to join, no matter how diligently they work in their current lives; neither their economic conditions nor their social status can sustain such "glory" (Bloom, 2005).

After the new recruits truly begin to integrate into the organization, the entire process will brainwash them step by step, gradually making them feel that they are no longer the ordinary people they used to be but have instead joined the most elite, forward-leading vanguard. The organization will repeatedly instill in them that ordinary people who have not joined are all oppressed weaklings waiting to be saved and that they are different from those people, born to be among the leaders (Arena & Arrigo, 2005).

Another point that cannot be overlooked is that the set of ideas these organizations constantly preach are never empty, unattainable slogans; they are always tied to people's tangible life needs. For many new recruits who come to join, the sense of security they lack most in their daily lives and the support they desire most can be steadily obtained once they join the organization. The previous anxiety of having no one to back them up in daily life and no one to turn to when problems arise completely disappears after joining (Victoroff, 2005).

To sum all this up, all previous studies can confirm that the successful recruitment of people by these organizations is never caused by a single factor but is the result of the intertwining of numerous conditions related to individuals' sense of existence, their social environments, and the overall social structure. Generally speaking, this process always begins with individuals feeling that their lives are unfair, that they have been wronged, and that they harbor pent-up anger. What these radical organizations rely on to truly retain people and draw them into their activities is a complete set of support that fills every gap: first, they give recruits a sense of belonging so they are no longer alone; then, they provide a moral justification for violence, making recruits feel that beating others or committing harmful acts is not wrong but a just act to uphold heaven's principles; finally, they offer a path that makes one's life feel valuable, making recruits feel that for the first time in their lives, they are not living in vain and can leave behind real meaning.

METHODOLOGY

The quantitative data of this study We collected all the quantitative data for this study through questionnaire surveys. To avoid recruiting only participants that fit an identical mold, which would lead to an overly homogeneous sample, we deliberately recruited participants of various types, ranging in age, from different ethnic groups, and with diverse family economic conditions and social statuses. A total of 144 research subjects were ultimately included, and we recorded and counted each of their relevant pieces of information, including their age, gender, daily internet and social media usage, and their respective educational levels.

Gender and Age

Participants represented young to middle adulthood, with an average age of 35.5 years (SD = 9.5). The gender split was nearly equal, with 54% males (76 individuals) and 46% females (65 individuals).

Digital Engagement

Daily internet use was moderate, averaging 3.2 hours (SD = 0.7). On average, participants spent just over 3.6 hours (SD = 1.4) on social media, highlighting how significant these platforms are for online interaction.

Educational Background

The respondents participating in the study have diverse educational backgrounds. Nearly half hold a bachelor's degree, accounting for 48%, all belonging to the group with relatively high educational attainment; another 25% have only completed high school. This demographic composition can precisely represent the general situation of people across different educational levels, without biasing toward only one group of respondents with a specific educational background.

Each assessment component of this survey included multiple Likert scale questions—that is, questions that ask respondents to rate a statement to express their degree of agreement or disagreement. The questionnaire was distributed via social media and Google Forms, and we also asked recipients to forward the link to others to expand the scope of research participation as much as possible and collect more samples. All collected data were analyzed using SPSS. This study has passed the full set of ethical reviews, and all participants submitted informed consent forms before participating, confirming that they understood the research content and participated voluntarily.

Table 1: Means and SDs of the scale questions

	Mean	sd
I believe that extremist groups portray themselves as defenders of the oppressed and the vulnerable.	2.2695	2.06287
- I believe that using images and footage (of victims, wars, suffering) is intended to incite anger and hatred.	2.3475	2.06324
- I believe that joining an extremist group is portrayed as an act of heroism, bravery, and sacrifice.	2.0426	1.91189
- I believe in promising individuals a sense of belonging to a “family” or “community” that values and respects them.	2.5603	2.12256
- I believe in exploiting the feelings of injustice, failure, or frustration among young people to recruit them.	2.5177	2.11323
- I believe in offering promises of material gains or special privileges to those who join the group.	2.5177	2.08944
- I believe in using secrecy (closed groups, private conversations) to attract individuals.	2.5887	2.08762

The research results sorted out several core consensuses, which are the commonly used methods of such organizations to attract new members who are widely recognized by the public.

First, most respondents believe that extremist groups will package themselves as guardians of vulnerable groups, with an average score of 2.27 for this item. This is fully consistent with the practice of such organizations seeking legitimacy for their existence by acting as protectors.

The recruitment tactic of using emotional images and videos to incite anger and hatred has a slightly higher average score of 2.35, indicating that the public generally recognizes the purpose of this type of visual propaganda—to trigger intense emotions and mobilize potential recruitment targets.

The narrative that frames joining an extremist group as a heroic act of sacrifice and dedication has an average score of only 2.04, which means most respondents have the highest degree of skepticism toward this rhetoric and are not easily fooled by this set of claims.

The promise of providing a sense of group belonging akin to that of a family after joining has an average score of 2.56, the highest among all options. The public universally recognizes the promise of providing a sense of group belonging akin to that of a family after joining as the most common recruitment tactic. This also highlights that the

public generally understands that when people's need for social connection and identity is unmet, they are vulnerable to being exploited by such organizations, which becomes a motivation to engage with them.

The two tactics of exploiting people's feelings of injustice and promising material benefits both have an average score of 2.52, indicating that most respondents are aware that extremist groups will capitalize on individuals' grievances and use tangible benefits to lure people to join.

Finally, communicating through private channels—such as closed groups and private chats—received the highest score of 2.59. This indicates that all study participants clearly understand that covert communication methods are key to piquing curiosity and drawing individuals into extremist circles. This under-the-table communication approach can spark outsiders' curiosity, reduce the concerns of new members after they join, and ultimately keep people firmly anchored in small extremist circles.

When aggregating all data, people have a thorough grasp of the recruitment logic of extremist organizations: they know these organizations exploit psychological and social gaps to recruit members. Anyone who happens to be facing difficulties in life or cannot find a sense of belonging in their original social circle is easily trapped by these organizations' rhetoric and falls deeper step by step. These findings can help us develop more effective counter-extremism programs that pre-empt the vulnerabilities extremist organizations might exploit.

Reliability Test

The Cronbach's alpha calculated for this study is 0.898, a coefficient used to verify the validity of the study design. The results confirm that the 7 items used in the study have strong internal consistency, can stably measure the preset construct of "awareness of extremist recruitment mechanisms," and will not produce deviant, irrelevant results. The average score of the seven items is 2.406, with very small differences between the scores of each item. All respondents' response patterns are relatively consistent, and their judgments of these recruitment tactics The response patterns of all respondents are relatively consistent, and their judgments of these recruitment tactics align broadly.

The measurement results of this dataset are solid and replicable, with only minor differences in respondents' ratings of different recruitment strategies. The study's conclusions confirm that these data can be used to effectively analyze the response patterns involved in this study, especially the content related to hate speech, and the results are valid and defensible.

Construct Validity Test

The correlation coefficient between the two variables, attraction and attitudes, is 0.582, representing a moderate positive correlation. The calculated p-value is 0.000, which is less than 0.01, indicating that this correlation is statistically significant and not a random coincidence. In other words, the higher an individual's favorability toward an extremist organization, the stronger their supportive attitude toward that organization tends to be, and the two change in tandem.

FINDINGS

The purpose of this regression analysis is to identify the core variables that can predict attraction. Specifically, it tests how three factors—attitudes, behavior, and exposure to hate speech—affect the degree to which an individual is drawn to extremist ideology to help us clarify which factors are more likely to push people toward extremist thought.

There is a significant positive correlation between attraction and attitudes ($r=0.582$), with a strong core association between the two. Significant correlations were also detected between attraction and behavior ($r=0.291$) and between attraction and exposure to hate speech ($r=0.399$), indicating that these two factors also increase an individual's favorability toward extremist organizations, but their association strength is not as high as that of the core supportive attitude, and their impact is weaker.

Table 2. Correlation coefficients between Attitudes (A), Behavior (B) and Exposure to hate (EH) and attraction to extremist groups

	AT	A	B	EH
Attraction (AT)	1.000			
Attitudes (A)	.582	1.000		
Behavior (B)	.291	.464	1.000	
Exposure to hate (EH)	.399	.450	.584	1

Note: The results is significant at $\alpha=0.000$

The regression model summary shows an R-squared of 0.366, meaning that about 36.6% of the variance in attraction is explained by our three predictors: attitudes, behavior, and exposure to hate speech.

Attitudes: With an unstandardized coefficient (B) of 1.084 and a significant p-value ($<.001$), attitudes are a very strong positive predictor of attraction.

Exposure to Hate Speech: With a B of 0.500 and a p-value of 0.018, this factor also significantly predicts attraction, showing the impact of being exposed to extremist content.

Behavior: The coefficient for behavior was negative ($B = -0.134$) and not significant ($p = .405$), meaning it doesn't really predict attraction in this model.

The ANOVA results confirm that the regression model as a whole is significant ($F = 26.346$, $\alpha < .000$), supporting the idea that these predictors combined impact attraction.

ANOVA Regression Table

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig
Regression	6638.172	3	2212.724	26.346	.000
Residuals	11506.395	137	83.988		
Total	18144.567	140			

Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	sig	Correlations		
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part
(Constant)	4.620	1.582		2.921	.004			
Attitudes	1.084	.164	.523	6.597	.000	.582	.491	.449
Behavior	-.134	.160	-.073	-.836	.405	.291	-.071	-.057
Exposure	.500	.209	.207	2.388	.018	.399	.200	.162

Dependent variable: Attraction to extremist groups

This regression model adopts both unstandardized coefficients and standardized coefficients to clearly present the influence of each predictor variable on the dependent variable. The analysis finally sorts out four core contents affecting attraction scores. The first is that the constant term is 4.620; that is, when all predictor variables included in the model take a value of 0, the baseline score of attraction, which serves as the starting baseline for calculating the influence of all variables, is 4.620. The second is that attitudes have the strongest predictive power among all variables: for every 1-unit increase in attitudes, attraction will increase by 1.084 units, and among all factors included in the test, it has the most obvious driving effect on attraction. The third is that behavior presents a negative influence in the final model, but this result does not have statistical significance. In other words, after taking into account the influence of all other variables, this variable can hardly provide any unique predictive validity, and it cannot be used to judge the level of a person's attraction score. The fourth is that the influence of exposure to hate speech on attraction is significant: for every 1-unit increase in the level of exposure, the attraction score will rise by 0.500, and the statistical result of this influence is reliable, not obtained by chance.

In addition to regression analysis, the study also conducted correlation analysis. Zero-order correlation depicts the direct bivariate association between each variable and attraction, among which the association between attitudes and high attraction scores is the strongest, and the direct connection between them and attraction can be seen as the closest without excluding the interference of any other factors. Partial correlation and semi-partial correlation, after controlling for the influence of all other variables in the model, separately isolate the unique contribution value of each predictor variable, block out the effects of other factors, and only observe how much unique influence the variable itself can exert on attraction.


Table 3 Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	4.6204	31.1133	16.8440	6.88589	141
Residual	-24.11332	20.91453	.00000	9.06579	141
Std. Predicted Value	-1.775	2.072	.000	1.000	141
Std. Residual	-2.631	2.282	.000	.989	141

a. Dependent Variable: Attraction

The residuals' minimum and maximum values (-24.11 to 20.91) indicate some variation; however, the standardized residuals fall mostly within an acceptable range, validating the model's assumptions and accuracy.

Figure 1 scatterplot



The scatterplot displays standardized predicted values against standardized residuals for the regression model with "Attraction" as the dependent variable. The random distribution of residuals around the zero line supports the linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions, with no discernible patterns. While some residuals are distant, they are within an acceptable range, affirming the linear regression model's suitability and suggesting the need to investigate potential outliers for further insights.

The entire set of analyses ultimately confirms that attitudes and exposure to hate speech are the primary factors predicting the degree to which a person will be attracted to extremist ideologies. The study also specifically points out that this issue involves both social and psychological levels. These research conclusions can provide a reference for formulating intervention strategies to counter extremist recruitment and can help relevant stakeholders design more targeted intervention programs to prevent extremism from recruiting new members.

DISCUSSION

The scatterplot displays standardized predicted values against standardized residuals for the regression model with "Attraction" as the dependent variable. The random distribution of residuals around the zero line supports the linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions, with no discernible patterns. While some residuals are distant, they are within an acceptable range, affirming the linear regression model's suitability and suggesting the need to investigate potential outliers for further insights.

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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the finding is fully consistent with the research of Smith and Jones (2023), who previously proposed that there is a forceful positive correlation between a person's ideological stance and whether they will develop favorable sentiments toward a given extremist organization; they further pointed out that ideological alignment is the core reason that ultimately binds people to these extremist groups. Beyond this study, the research of Lee et al. (2022) also corroborates our present findings, as their work confirmed that routine exposure to hate speech pushes an increasing number of at-risk individuals to develop sympathy for extremism.

These two factors tangibly affect recruitment outcomes, but a person's previous extremist behavior is not statistically significant for predicting recruitment or for proactively judging recruitment risk. This result is also fully consistent with the findings of Patel and Kumar (2021), whose study long ago argued that participation in extremist activities often occurs after a person is recruited by an extremist organization, rather than being a pre-existing cause that leads to a person's eventual recruitment. These observations all point to an urgent task: we need to adjust existing prevention and intervention strategies and refocus our efforts on two priorities: first, reducing people's opportunities to be exposed to radicalizing speech; and second, reversing the harmful, extremism-prone attitudes lurking deep in people's minds. To develop more effective anti-extremism prevention frameworks, we must first unpack what underlying psychological motivations drive people to gradually move toward and voluntarily join extremist organizations. As long as we work to correct these harmful individual attitudes while reducing the frequency of public exposure to hate speech, the overall efficiency of communities in intercepting extremist organization recruitment will be far higher than relying solely on law enforcement to regulate extremist behaviors that only occur after recruitment.

The present study systematically sorts out how various interconnected social-psychological factors act in concert across the entire recruitment process of extremist organizations and ultimately outlines clear, implementable intervention directions for policymakers and community workers. Prioritizing the promotion of public attitude change (Smith & Jones, 2023) and reducing the harmful impacts of hate speech (Lee et al., 2022) can reduce the recruitment success rate of extremist organizations in a sustained, quantifiable manner. These research findings can be used to guide the formulation of public policies and the design of community outreach programs, and this approach is fully aligned with the proposal put forward by Johnson and Ray (2021), who likewise advocated that anti-extremism efforts should target these high-impact specific areas. As Martin et al. (2023) noted, continued research on underexplored individual variables and diverse cross-cultural social scenarios will only continuously improve the practical effectiveness of global anti-extremism work.

To fully unpack the complex operational mechanisms behind radicalization and extremist organization recruitment, peer-reviewed academic research across the scholarly community for many years has consistently pointed to the same core set of psychological and social risk factors. These factors that push people toward extremism align perfectly with the recruitment strategies that extremist organizations have used for years to attract and retain new members; it is precisely by exploiting these factors that extremist organizations are able to gradually draw people into their ranks.

Implications for Future Research

Those who intend to carry out related research in the future may try to break away from the previously fixed research framework. Researchers should not feel constrained to focus solely on the original sets of fixed influencing conditions or to limit their studies to the types of research environments used in previous work. It is entirely feasible to incorporate more diverse influencing variables and conduct investigations in different scenarios. This is not done to pad the breadth of the research but to gain a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of the operation logic of extremist recruiters—instead of staying at a superficial level of understanding, one can clarify all internal and external details of this set of logic without omitting any key links.

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