
REBUILDING AFTER CONFLICT: HOW EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE SHAPED KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA'S RECOVERY (2008–2022)

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Abstract

The study provides a thorough analysis of peace building tactics used by Pakistani political parties Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) through their security protocols and institutional changes and economic development initiatives. During its role as head of government from 2008 to 2013 ANP followed military counterterrorism principles with tribal force reliance and short-term crisis resolution. The immediate stability achieved by this plan did not create lasting governance structures that created sustained security threats. PTI followed a governance-driven peacebuilding approach between 2013 and 2023 by merging FATA with KP along with implementing judicial accountability systems while using intelligence-focused security operations. PTI adopted industrial and digital governance strategies during its rule but encountered financial hurdles while trying to execute these policies. Analysis shows that ANP used security as its main approach but peace was only temporary because of its unsustainability whereas PTI implemented long-term structural governance reforms through its governing strategy.

KEYWORDS: PTI, FATA, ANP, PEACEBUILDING, JUDICIAL, TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION:

Defining Peacebuilding in Conflict-Prone Regions

Modern international relations with both public and private sectors focus on peacebuilding to minimize social unrest while developing sustainable peaceful environments. The multi-dimensional approach requires economic and social and political strategies which target violence origins to make communities more resistant. This key concept experienced major development since its inception as local communities now have primary control in ownership and drive conflicts towards resolution from the ground up. Peacebuilding needs the crucial involvement of governments together with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international institutions plus civil society groups which work towards sustainable peacebuilding initiatives in diverse contexts. Conflict complexity from ethnic and religious and ideological disputes has created the necessity to advance peacebuilding strategy understanding as well as actor roles comprehension.

Peacebuilding operations remain essential for unstable regions because these areas commonly encounter years of instability that disrupts political control along with economic growth and protects human rights. The necessity for continuous and well-unified peace initiatives emerged through ongoing regional conflicts that include the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and Latin American areas. Peacebuilding initiatives need to simultaneously address immediate security threats together with addressing long-standing structural issues because these conflicts derive from fundamental political oppression and economic deprivation and historical wrongs (Adegbami 2020). These states need complete peacebuilding approaches to stop themselves from reverting to perpetual violence patterns that create unacceptable global and regional safety threats. Meaningful enduring peace requires projects that surpass military action to build economic prosperity and foster reconciliation among people while creating institutions which can stabilize society over time.

Governments are essential for peacebuilding through their implementation of legal structures and development of social harmonization policies and management of effective state institutions. Long-term stability heavily depends on a powerful government because it safeguards order through its law enforcement system and defends human rights and delivers essential public services. The ability to execute successful peacebuilding programs is severely restricted in regions affected by conflict because of dysfunctional governance systems and systemic corruption and unwillingness among political leaders (Byrne, Thiessen, & Irvin, 2020). Governments play a role in worsening ethnic conflicts because they implement discrimination measures and follow policies that exclude people while performing repressive actions against minority communities. The essential role of peacebuilding relies heavily on

building strong state institutions and promoting good governance principles. Genuine peace processes require governments to build relationships with their opposition groups and civil society organizations and international partners for complete peacebuilding inclusion.

Peacebuilding has become a fundamental role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs especially in areas where state authorities lack credibility or possess weak structures. Various civil society organizations with faith-based and grassroots movements and advocacy groups actively pursue conflict resolution and mediation as well as post-conflict reconstruction. At the community scale these groups promote dialogue by offering humanitarian aid and work to establish peace between conflicting parties (Mcfarlane, 2020). The peacebuilding operations led by civil society avoid political biases that shape state-controlled efforts because they put local community needs at their core and maintain adaptation capabilities to emerging requirements. Peacebuilding efforts through community-based programs have proven essential in healing divisions and rebuilding trust in Northern Ireland as well as Rwanda and Colombia according to Lagana and White (2021).

Civil society organizations encounter vital obstacles for peacebuilding efforts because many authoritarian states together with conflict zones are experiencing restricted civic rights. Governments in authoritarian and conflict-afflicted states see CSOs as a threat to their control which leads them to establish limitations on organization activities that restrict operational effectiveness. Civil society organizations in Cameroon's Anglophone conflict have faced coercion including harassment and censorship and physical violence which diminishes their ability to help resolve the conflict (Annan, Beseng, Crawford, & Kewir, 2021). Under challenging circumstances CSOs maintain their essential role through human rights abuse documentation and advocacy for peace mediation between conflicting parties. Civil society organizations remain essential for peacebuilding because they can both energize communities and construct relationships between groups that fight each other.

Governance and Peacebuilding Models

The models which govern state operations determine essential aspects of successful peacebuilding work in regions that experience elevated conflict levels. Transparency in political processes along with inclusive decision-making methods serve to bring stability and institutional growth while actively resolving conflicts in the long-term. Peacebuilding discourse discusses mainly two governance models which are recognized as either top-down or bottom-up approaches. The governance models in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Pakistan face unique strengths and barriers for transforming conflicts because they must combine state-led strategies with community-based programs (Gulbahar, Khan, & Jan 2023).

This state-centric model views peacebuilding through the perspective that nations or provinces should lead all phases of policy-making related to conflict management. State-led peacebuilding strategies in this domain depend on legislative changes along with military actions under bureaucratic supervision while being supported through international aid projects. The KP governments keep using top-down policies as their main strategy for counterterrorism operations together with infrastructure programs. The Pakistani counterterrorism plan using Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad launches federal and provincial government directives that control peace operations but engage few stakeholders at the local level (Shahzad, Nawaz, & Jan 2023).

Top-down strategies excel at implementing vast-scale institutional reforms and security measures as their main benefit. The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan has enabled provincial governments to take greater control hence promoting state-led peacebuilding through decentralizing governance. Centralized governance faces criticism for poor implementation of local conditions and grassroots involvement since it leads to unsustainable peacebuilding operations according to Nosheen & Anwar (2023).

The bottom-up peacebuilding model relies on local community directions through locally-governed structures which base their decisions on broad-based participation of residents. Local actors comprising grassroots movements along with traditional leadership and civil society organizations need to play an active role during governance processes for sustainable peace to be achieved. According to Bano and Alam (2024) KP implemented the Local Government Act of 2013 to transfer political authority from provincial to district and tehsil levels to enhance community participation in peacebuilding.

Decentralization represents a governance strategy that generates enormous discussions throughout KP's political domain. Post-18th Amendment Pakistan has seen a combination of conclusions from the decentralization of fiscal and administrative operations. Local governments should have ability to control their development strategies and security measures however structural problems alongside bureaucratic pushback prevent decentralization from meeting its theoretical potential. Numerous local authorities within KP face constraints because they do not independently control funds or wield enough political power to undertake successful peacebuilding efforts according to Atif & Nazir (2023).

Stable peace depends heavily on strong governance systems to attain effective conflict resolution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The ongoing conflicts show historical evidence of deteriorating because of governance deficiencies such as corruption and weak institutional capacity and unstable political environment. The 2018 merger between KP and FATA marked a historic government change that worked to connect disenfranchised people with central political systems. The transition process has encountered multiple difficulties because tribal communities oppose it, and the available infrastructure is insufficient along with numerous legal uncertainties (Khan & Nazir, 2023).

The peacebuilding governance approaches implemented by the Awami National Party (ANP) differ significantly from those of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The Awami National Party directed KP administration through

political negotiations from 2008 until 2013 by advocating dialogue with militants alongside infrastructural and educational development initiatives. Since its provincial dominance began in 2013 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf concentrated on boosting government performance while carrying out anti-corruption programs along with institutional development initiatives for peacebuilding purposes. The two political parties worked to better the government but lacked complete endorsement of grassroots peacebuilding approaches through centralized policy frameworks as Ahmed and Khan (2023) show.

The PTI government in KP brought forward the Sehat Sahulat Programme (SSP) which provided universal healthcare benefits to enhance social welfare while reducing stability-disrupting economic problems. The international development bank KfW joined forces with the German Development Bank (KfW) to support this combined approach of top-down governance structures and globe peaceful development programs. Research shows SSP adds healthcare accessibility but its organizational performance challenges alongside economic stability issues continue to emerge (Khan, Cresswell, & Sheikh, 2023).

Peacebuilding and governance development succeed because of their effective judicial systems combined with law enforcement structures. When Model Courts began operations in KP during 2019 they aimed to smooth criminal legal processes and improve local faith in the judicial system. The establishment of these courts proved successful in clearing up backlogged criminal proceedings thus handling one essential barrier to achieving peace through judicial efficiency. Long-term evaluations about how Model Courts affect peace resolution processes have shown limited evidence (Shahzad, Nawaz, & Jan 2023).

ANP's Governance and Peacebuilding Strategies (2008-2013)

For the duration of 2008 to 2013 the Awami National Party (ANP) took a leading position in establishing governance mechanisms and establishing peace projects across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The Awami National Party executed various initiatives from dealing with militant insurgencies through military campaigns while establishing counter-extremism education programs and conducting political talks with tribal leaders during its governing period. During its time in power ANP encountered major obstacles to its leadership such as militant terrorist attacks in addition to resistance towards political change and administration problems (Khosro & Rovidad, 2023).

Military Operations Against Militants

The counterterrorist strategy of ANP governance reached its peak through its backing of military anti-TTP and associated militant groups assaults. The party fully backed Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009) as well as Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010) because these actions sought to erase extremist threats from both Swat Valley and South Waziristan.

Swat Valley saw the start of Operation Rah-e-Rast due to the growing power of Maulana Fazlullah and the Swat Taliban movement. The goal of the operation was the elimination of Taliban administration structures while bringing back state control of the area. Operation execution was led by the Pakistan Army together with Frontier Corps and law enforcement agencies who forced two million residents to leave their homes. Despite achieving initial success, the operation failed to resolve continuing governance problems (Ullah, Marwat, & Safi, 2024).

Operation Rah-e-Nijat acted in parallel with other military efforts in South Waziristan to wipe out TTP positions in that region. Through this military operation Pakistan's forces killed essential leaders from the Taliban yet much of the nation's infrastructure suffered irreversible destruction. The government under the ANP supported these military operations because it believed peace was needed to stop KP from becoming a militant base for attacks (Abbasi, 2024).

The attainment of military victories through these operations proved to create major human rights issues. Massive population displacement together with destroyed livelihoods and home destruction triggered local community animosity which directed toward the ANP government for alleged military collaboration. The recuperation phase stretched out long months for families whose homes were destroyed during displacement while they labored to return home. After military operations ANP struggled to execute swift post-conflict reconstruction together with effective governance which became the main weakness of its rule (Khosro & Rovidad, 2023).

Education and Counter-Extremism Programs

ANP identified education as a critical counter-terrorism tool so it enacted various educational reforms which separated religious studies from schools and supported Pashto teaching and cut down religious brainwashing across state departments. The Pakistan government implemented the rebirth of NWFP into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through KPK in 2010 to fortify the Pashtun ethnic foundation. The renaming of Northwest Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa met resistance regarding nationalist and religious movements especially from Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) (Bashir, Ahmad, & Bhatti, 2023).

Through its major initiative ANP directed its efforts toward developing and creating new educational facilities in areas haunted by conflict. The Bacha Khan Education Foundation maximized its mission to advance modern and secular education across KP because its inspiration stemmed from party philosophy. The Taliban waged systematic attacks against educational institutions to disrupt the efforts of constructing new schools that instructed girls specifically. Under ANP leadership in 2012 Malala Yousafzai came under a deadly assassination attempt representing the dangerous environment experienced by students and teachers (Khan, Gill, & Mustafa, 2024).

The policymakers of Malakand and Swat established de-radicalization initiatives to help former militancy participants become social contributors after their rehabilitation process. The Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation operated as a rehabilitation program which used combination therapy of mental health counseling and vocational training with religious reformation methods to counter extremism. Critics of these programs expressed concern about their sustainability because they received insufficient funding and faced governance challenges according to Ali & Bukhari (2024).

PTI's Governance and Peacebuilding Strategies (2013-2023)

From 2013 to 2023 the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party under its leadership in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) implemented transformative governance reforms which focused on judicial and police system restructuring as well as economic development and ex-militant reintegration and institutional growth. PTI used counterterrorism strategies together with socio-economic development and international partnerships as its peacebuilding approach during 2013-2023 yet faced resistance from political instability and funding limits and security-related obstacles (Abbass, Bano, & Hussain, 2024).

Judicial and Police Reforms in Peacebuilding

PTI made judicial and police system restructuring their key peacebuilding effort in KP because it improved both efficiency and counter-terrorism performance. The party implemented changes to KP Police institutions which freed them from political interference. The Police Act of 2017 established operational independence for law enforcement forces which subsequently cut down both institutional and governmental interference in police activities (Zaman & Mushtaq, 2024).

Through its PTI platform the organization started Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms which established community-based dispute settlement committees to facilitate conflict resolution and mediation. The created ADR systems served two objectives of building judicial credibility and clearing up court backlog according to Faiz (2023). The implementation of full-scaled reforms had limitations due to tribal resistance and insufficient trained mediators and legal complexity issues (Ashraf & Tahir, 2024).

Under PTI the administration introduced e-governance by implementing digital case management alongside crime reporting systems in judicial and police departments. This reduced manual inefficiencies and corruption while improving citizen access to justice (Sultan & Anwar, 2023). Critics pointed out that these digital reforms operated poorly in rural districts since internet access remains minimal alongside limited technical expertise (Khan, Cresswell, & Sheikh, 2023).

Rehabilitation of Ex-Militants and Integration Policies

A critical aspect of the governance strategy created by PTI entailed the social transition program for ex-militants. The Pakistani government began targeted de-radicalization programs for ex-Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan members and militants belonging to other groups after discovering military solutions alone were insufficient. Under PTI the government expanded previous government initiatives by growing the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation in Swat into a center that offered vocational training together with psychological counseling and religious re-education (Batool, Yilmaz, & Shakil, 2023).

The return of numerous former militants to terrorist groups became prominently visible following the 2021 Taliban seizure of Afghanistan when the insurgents established free operating space for TTP members. The negotiation-based militant policy implemented by PTI proved ineffective because TTP factions restarted their attacks against KP and Balochistan (Nurzaman & Wibowo, 2024).

PTI established community-based security programs as part of their security strategy for tribal districts that were merged through the 25th Constitutional Amendment (2018). A significant move in 2018 united KP together with Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to establish a foundation for tribal governance integration with the rest of Pakistan. The integration between the Pakistan security forces and the various tribal communities progressed slowly because of bureaucratic inefficiencies and resistance from tribal elders together with inadequate financial management (Ahmad, 2023).

Investment in Economic Development and Governance Reforms

Under PTI's leadership KP benefited from extensive prioritization of economic growth which involved drawing capital from abroad along with constructing infrastructure and developing industrial activities in the province. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) acted as PTI's primary development initiative by creating projects which focused on building energy infrastructure and transportation systems and trade links (Malik & Tudor, 2024). KP implemented the Sehat Sahulat Programme (SSP) under PTI as its key policy through financial support from the German Development Bank (KfW). The healthcare initiative established under this program offered free medical services to poor residents in order to increase public healthcare accessibility. The healthcare system faced financial difficulties because healthcare costs were on the rise while government funding levels remained limited according to Khan, Cresswell, and Sheikh (2023).

PTI dedicated its efforts to developing the tourism sector across Swat and Kaghan and Chitral valleys of KP. The Government allocated funds to construct road infrastructure along with making essential tourist accommodation and implementing security programs to develop tourism. Tourism revenue growth became a matter of concern as

environmental damage and regulatory inadequacies received increasing opposition from local residents (Abbasi, 2024).

Economic development did not prevent PTI from dealing with financial management issues. Public revenue collection remained challenging for the government, so they depended on international financial assistance and loans. The government faced increasing public anger from urban residents due to continuous rises in inflation and devaluation of currency and growing employment challenges (Ahmad, 2023).

Institutional Strengthening and International Partnerships

PTI worked on establishing institutional power through both decentralization efforts and restructuring of public administration. Transparency and government accountability became central objectives of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) when the Right to Information Act (2013) was enacted as one of their earliest reform measures. Researches identified the act as the world's third most effective piece of legislation although bureaucratic inaction and political influence limited its ability to be put into practice (Sultan & Anwar, 2023).

Through international partnerships PTI secured funding for infrastructure development and security partnerships as well as education programs by working with donors and global institutions and multilateral organizations. The party encountered international complications with the United States because of its diplomatic approaches toward Afghanistan and the relationships with China. The deteriorating relations between Pakistan and Western partners resulted in lower foreign aid along with reduced investment which created obstacles to both economic and governance actions (Khatoon, Khan, & Shabir, 2023).

Civil-military relations in Pakistan under PTI underwent substantial changes from 2022 onward after Imran Khan's political dismissal in that year. When the party maintained opposition against the military ruling system it caused continuous political turbulence and distorted governance management. The general election of 2024 exposed growing tensions between PTI and the military as the party presented claims of election manipulation as well as acts of political opposition suppression (Ahmad, 2023).

Challenges and Setbacks in PTI's Governance Model

The effectiveness of PTI's reform initiatives in law enforcement and economic development and institutional governance faced challenges mainly because of multiple obstacles. The political unification between FATA and KP proved momentous but did not establish sufficient connections between tribal-dominated areas and provincial government institutions (Faiz, 2023).

Security issues became a principal obstacle because the TTP reinforced its presence in KP and border areas which produced greater attacks against military forces and civilian targets. PTI's insufficient counterterrorism planning plus its inability to maintain lasting peace with TTP enabled these terrorist groups to persist with attacks resulting in unstable conditions (Ashraf Abbasi, 2024).

PTI governance suffered from continuous political turbulence after Imran Khan became the subject of the 2022 no-confidence vote. When PTI lost political power in 2023 their administrative structure suffered total immobility so development initiatives along with all security plans were frozen (Ahmad, 2023).




Figure 2: Comparative Governance Strategies of ANP and PTI in KP

PTI's eight-year governance of KP brought an extensive change through judicial reforms and police reforms along with economic investments and institutional enhancements and international partnership development. The progressive governance systems launched by PTI were impeded by budgetary limits as well as a turbulent political climate and safety issues that reduced its extended operational success. Success in KP's future peacebuilding demands an even distribution of efforts between economic development together with counterterrorism measures and democratic governance to establish enduring stability with growth.

Challenges in Civil Society Engagement in Governance

Numerous factors create obstacles for NGOs seeking involvement in governance and peacebuilding activities in KP despite their valuable contributions to the sector. The main urgent matter in this context is safety threats at the

forefront of concerns. Extremist organizations actively threaten civil society activists and NGO workers who encounter deaths threats while abducting them and conducting assaults on their organizational facilities. Security threats produced by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) after 2021 grew worse because militants blamed NGOs for spreading Western ideologies (Khalid, Basit, & Sohail, 2024).

The activities of NGOs encounter numerous hurdles because of existing political limitations. The federal and provincial authorities have established tight regulations for organizations with foreign funding which now need enhanced oversight and financial transparency for all their projects and governmental permission for projects to proceed. The imposed limitations restrict both humanitarian aid distribution and obstruct peacebuilding programs (Shafiq, 2024).

The shortage of available funds causes additional barriers for civil society groups trying to participate in governance systems. Leading NGOs depend heavily on international donor support while this financial support becomes inconsistent due to fluctuating geopolitical priorities of worldwide donors. Many peacebuilding projects developed by NGOs suffered discontinuation because they lacked funding resources. The provincial government departments slow down project approvals and grant allocations through their bureaucratic processes, thus affecting the implementation efficiency (Waheed, Afzal, & Mughal, 2024).

The Role of Civil Society in Governance Reforms

Civil society organizations have acted as critical entities toward pushing forward governance reforms in KP despite facing obstacles. Non-government organizations push policymakers into making decisions that create more openness while improving transparency measures and making decision-making spaces accessible to everyone. The support of civil society for local government elections has proven essential for attracting women voters together with marginalized populations (Bano & Alam, 2024).

Various non-government organizations collaborate with government agencies for implementing educational reforms in areas experiencing conflict. The combination of programs which deliver different educational approaches to displaced children plus youth vocational training functions as a dual strategy to stop militant recruitment and create financial opportunities for at-risk communities (Iqbal, Irshadullah, & Idris, 2024).

Charitable organizations remain actively involved in voting advocacy and human rights education and policy research activities to help support evidence-based governance. The policy shaping influence of NGOs stays restricted despite grassroots stakeholders remaining out of decision-making processes implemented by government institutions using their centralized authority (Khalid, Basit & Sohail 2024).

Way Forward: Strengthening Civil Society's Role in Peacebuilding and Governance

To strengthen the role of civil society in **peacebuilding and governance reforms in KP**, several policy measures should be adopted:

- The provincial authority needs to develop security systems together with police forces which will protect NGO personnel while active in areas at risk of conflict (Khan, Ahmad, & Shahid, 2024).
- More efficient development program execution emerges when NGOs can access streamlined registration procedures through simplified funding approval mechanisms as well as coordinated government-NGO mechanisms (Waheed, Afzal, & Mughal, 2024).
- The improved connection between NGOs and local government officials through enhanced collaboration would enhance both policy participation and grassroots initiative execution (Iqbal, Irshadullah, & Idris, 2024).
- More permanent funds for peacebuilding work can be achieved by building relationships between private sector entities and homegrown donors to cut back on foreign donor reliance (Bano & Alam, 2024).
- Public interest organizations need to participate in government-led de-radicalization programs and youth engagement initiatives and counter-extremism policies to create strong community defenses against militancy according to Khan, Wu and Dewei (2024).

Civil society together with NGOs serves as the essential catalyst behind peace-building as well as governance improvements and community engagement efforts in KP. Their community-focused peace initiatives combined with human rights advocacy work with educational programs help residents resist conflict and extremism. Many obstacles such as safety hazards and limitations caused by government policies and budgetary issues block their ability to function correctly. Enhanced security while reducing bureaucratic obstacles alongside sustainable funding mechanisms will prove essential to preserve civil society as an essential component that strengthens governance and peacebuilding in KP.

Challenges and Limitations in Peacebuilding Efforts

The peacebuilding efforts of ANP and PTI had to push through various organizational, political, and financial barriers. Key challenges include:

1. Over-reliance on security forces for stability

ANP achieved peace through military actions without preparing its institutions to handle security challenges. PTI tried to put civilian leadership in charge of security but could not overcome government resistance and budget problems.

2. Institutional weaknesses and lack of policy continuity

The security plans from ANP failed due to the absence of key institutional changes. PTI's strategic programs to improve justice and decision-making failed because the public service system created many challenges to implementation.

3. Economic constraints and limited job opportunities

Economic development and job addition programs failed to provide adequate results for governance changes to work effectively. The high number of young unemployed people served as dangerous targets for extremist groups despite law enforcement operations.

4. Public distrust in governance institutions

Public trust in government fell because administrative systems were badly managed from all angles. ANP failed to gain urban support because of its tribal council practices while PTI ran into doubt because its governance changes took too long.

Policy Implications and Future Peacebuilding Strategies

Building peace in KP needs a complete policy structure that combines law enforcement steps with resilient institutions plus financial growth and community input. Future strategies should prioritize.

Our peace program succeeds when we spread power to local government and eliminate hidden court practices. The strategy involves implementing public safety techniques alongside security gathering to decrease military involvement. The pursuit of multiple industries alongside an economy boost will create permanent employment in war-hit areas. Governance leaders should invite tribal communities and women from marginalized areas into decision-making systems to design better peace solutions.

CONCLUSION AND FINAL ASSESSMENT

This research shows ANP aimed for immediate military security while PTI used long-term governance updates for peacebuilding. ANP achieved immediate victory by fighting against security threats but did not resolve government leadership and financial discrepancies. The PTI administration brought governance changes through reforms that had compromised success due to implementation problems.

A lasting peace in KP requires future governance plans to connect security supplements with economic growth and institutional improvements. The strongest path to peace in Pakistan depends on creating a security system that works with good government controls while bringing more people into the economic system and allowing them to help design solutions.

Our study reveals that peacebuilding becomes better when authorities adjust their policies while developing their organizational systems over time. Future lawmakers must keep proposed plans ongoing and involve community members while maintaining economic well-being to create sustained peace in KP and Pakistan.

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