

ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF BALOCHISTAN

FAISAL RASHID¹, DR. ARFAN MAHMOOD*²

¹ PHD SCHOLAR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MUSLIM YOUTH UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN. E-MAIL: estateofficer.pupc@pu.edu.pk

² ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, ADJUNCT FACULTY MEMBER, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MUSLIM YOUTH UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD, AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, CENTRE FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE, PAKISTAN.

*Corresponding Author E-MAIL: arfanmahmood.csas@pu.edu.pk

ABSTRACT

This study explores the intricate interaction between models of the political economy and the persistence of terrorism in Balochistan, which is the largest province territorially in Pakistan but the most economically marginalized area. Although Balochistan has a lot of natural resources, such as natural gas reserves, copper deposits, and coal mines, Balochistan has been entangled in underdevelopment cycles, with the poverty rates much higher than the national rates, and unemployment among the youth being a major socioeconomic problem. The paradoxical nature of the province, consisting of an abundance of resources and institutional poverty, requires strict consideration of the processes by which the failure to govern resources can be transformed into the threat of security. This paper uses a research method that incorporates a two-theory approach (Relative Deprivation Theory and Structural Violence Theory) to explain how institutional structures tend to ensure that resource extraction benefits are concentrated at the federal level and costs and environmental degradation are transferred to provincial communities. This skewed distribution creates accumulating grievances beyond the material deprivation to include political marginalization, cultural marginalization, and loss of institutional legitimacy. The research, based on systematic qualitative analysis of historical sources and records of the policies as well as the literature by scholars, proves that terrorism in Balochistan is a logical reaction to structural injustice instead of an expression of ideological extremism.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, Political marginalization, Institutional Legitimacy, Relative Deprivation Theory, Structural Violence Theory, Ideological Extremism, Balochistan.

1 INTRODUCTION

9/11 has brought about unprecedented rates of terrorist violence to the nations of all continents. As much as the influence of terrorism is experienced in a manner that is generally widespread, the effects of terrorism vary greatly depending on geographic regions and circumstances. Pakistan, being one of the most impacted countries, has been experiencing continuous terrorist attacks since the late 1970s, and with escalation after the post-2001 era. The effect of terrorism in Pakistan is more pronounced in places that are already in distress, in terms of poverty, corruption, bad governance, religious conflicts, and lack of infrastructure.

Balochistan is one of the provinces of Pakistan that is full of explanations of the intricate relationship of terrorism with the failure of governance, political marginalization, and unequal allocation of resources. Balochistan is the most vulnerable and unstable area, although it is the largest province in Pakistan in terms of territory and natural wealth. The province lies geographically close to Afghanistan and Iran and is a passage way to the international economic projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has aggravated its geopolitical exposure.

The violence of terror in the context of Balochistan can operate in various forms: separatist insurgent groups against the state infrastructure, sectarian groups against the minority population, and criminal groups based on the lack of good governance structures. These instances of inter-secting violence signify underlying structural realities of historical grievances, political marginalization, and socioeconomic disparities. Terrorism, insurgency, and counterterrorism activities have become an established part of everyday life among the people of Balochistan, and these actions have essentially defined the safety of people, politics, society, and the relationships between the states and their citizens.

In Pakistan, the scholarship and policy interest in the subject of terrorism has been skewed in favor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, with Balochistan being seen as a secondary or a challenge to security. This analytical gap makes invisible the province's peculiar patterns of terrorism, which are being motivated by specific factors of the political economy, not only by ideological or tactical military factors. The study of terrorism persistence in Balochistan cannot be limited to traditional security-related models, but it is necessary to consider how institution-based, resource

control, and center-periphery relations perpetuate the decades of violent mobilization.

As far as research objectives are concerned, the study will analyse the role of the aspects of political economy, namely the patterns of resource extraction, lack of governance, and marginalization of the institutions, in creating and perpetuating the environments that allow terrorism in Balochistan to persist. Instead of focusing on the roots of terrorism, this paper highlights modern persistence processes and raises the question of why decades of military counterterrorism efforts have not decreased militant mobilization and have not removed terrorist groups.

Three key questions are discussed in the paper:

- What role do center-periphery resource relations and the outcome of unequal developments contribute to relative deprivation and grievance-based mobilization of Balochistan as a province into terrorism?
- How are institutional structures and breakdown of governance that support terrorism through marginalizing provincial politics and restricting democratic accountability perpetuated?
- What are the ways in which security-exclusive counterterrorism strategies contribute to fostering structural conditions that still allow perpetuation of violence, thus creating counterproductive security-development trade-offs?

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Definitional Aspects of Terrorism

The definition of terrorism is still a controversial topic in the scholarly world. Charles Tilly (2004) separates terrorism among other types of violence by stating that it involves non-targeted non-combatants and is specifically designed to produce fear and political concessions. According to Martha Crenshaw (1981), terrorism is a calculated political violence that is aimed at conveying messages and impacting different audiences. These definitions focus on the communicative and political aspects of terrorism as opposed to regarding it as criminal violence.

The differences between direct, structural, and cultural violence introduced by Johan Galtung (1969) give analytical models of how institutional settings give rise to terrorism. Direct violence is physical harm, structural violence is institutional structures that cause suffering without necessarily causing force, and cultural violence justifies direct and structural violence with the ideological systems. The persistence of terrorism can be understood with respect to how institutional frameworks and cultural discourses make violence mobilization possible beyond the operational tactical contexts.

According to Louise Richardson (2002), there are three fundamental terrorist motivations, namely, grievance, identity, and right. Grievance-based Terrorism- actions stem out of a perception of injustice; identity-based Terrorism- actions safeguard group boundaries, cultural uniqueness; and rights-based Terrorism- actions deal with rejection of political representation. The terrorism of Balochistan is a manifestation of all three dimensions of the grievance based on the inequality of resources, the threat to identity based on the marginalization of the state, and the deprivation of political rights based on institutional marginalization.

2.2 Terrorism in Pakistan: Trends and Patterns

The Pakistan terrorism situation has undergone a series of distinct periods, which date back to the late 1970s. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) brought the ideologies of militarization, the spread of weapons, and jihad in Pakistan tribal areas. The Taliban rule (1996-2001) widened the capability of Pakistan to be a haven and a training center for extremist groups. The post 9/11 era (2001-present) was characterized by an increase in terrorist attacks against state institutions, security staff, and civilians.

According to academic surveys, in Pakistan, more than 80,000 people have died in connection with terrorism since 2001, and the activities of terrorist groups can be traced in various provinces. Although most of the focus is on the terrorist activities of al-Qaeda allied groups and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within the territory of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the terrorism situation in Balochistan has different organizational structures and motivation patterns. Hassan Abbas (2011) records the fact that the internal security issue in Pakistan escalated as the failure of governance was accompanied by instability in the region and radicalization. According to Stephen Cohen (2002), the governance crisis in Pakistan, which is defined by military interventions, poor democratic institutions, and centralized decision-making, is an enabling factor for violence and extremism.

2.3 Balochistan History of Conflict and Insurgency

Since 1947, Balochistan has been in conflict with the Pakistani state. The 1948 accession war, the 1973-1977 rebellion, and the post-2006 insurrections demonstrate repetitive trends of rebellious military aggression and state military reaction. These cycles are indications of unsolved issues concerning provincial autonomy, ownership of resources, and political representation.

In the 1970s, Selig Harrison (1978) reported the first major Baloch resistance and stated that the issue of resource disputes and marginalization were the underlying factors. This was met by massive military actions by the government forces, which generated resentments that lasted decades. Frederic Grare (2006) examines the ways that the development policies of the state were biased towards centralized authority as opposed to provincial autonomy, which

leads to the concentration of resource extraction gains in federal hands and the diffusion of the cost among the Baloch people.

The insurgency after 2004 recorded an increased level of insurgency due to the military operations in Dera Bugti and a controversial resource settlement. Ayesha Jalal (1995) describes that cycles of democracy-authoritarianism in Pakistan prevented institutional development, which left the peripheral areas, such as Balochistan, without a proper political avenue of grievance. Such failure of governance ended up creating conditions in which armed struggle was a logical substitute for political engagement.

2.4 Baluchistan Socioeconomic and Political Grievances

The Balochistan region has one-sided development imbalances, though the region is endowed with resources. The mineral resource of natural gas can contribute to significant federal revenues, but the poverty indicators of Balochistan are higher than national averages. The development of infrastructure is focused on federal regions, whereas provinces do not have electricity, clean water, roads, or schools.

S. Akbar Zaidi (2011) records the pattern of extraction of natural resources in Baluchistan, whereby extracted resources are utilized to the extent of extraction by other places and provinces without the balance of provincial externalities. This arrangement is what Dipak Gupta (2005) refers to as relative deprivation, the feeling of unfair inequality in the distribution of resources expected and realized. This kind of deprivation is a major source of terrorism motivation, especially coupled with the shutting down of other political expression avenues through the institutions.

Muhammad Waseem (2006) points out ethnic conflict in Pakistan as a result of the failure of federalism, which could not reconcile provincial autonomy and equity of resources. The structures of centralized decision-making leave out provincial voices when it comes to policy-making, creating a feeling of political marginalization. These wider issues of federalism can be seen in the case of Balochistan, in which there is a lack of political representation, and decisions about resource distribution do not involve provincial input, and political accountability is ineffective.

Rizwana Shamshad (2011) examines the case of militancy in Balochistan and establishes it as directly related to the lack of political representation and the presence of grievances. Societies that have been sidelined in political affairs and are characterized by unequal distribution of resources are characterized by a high propensity to terrorism. This discussion indicates that the only way to solve terrorism is through institutional changes that allow political involvement besides security activities.

2.5 Regional and International Actors in the Security Dynamics of Balochistan

The issue with Iran and Afghanistan is that the two countries are quite near to each other, and thus, this affects the security environment of Balochistan. Regional spill-over dynamics are created by transnational militant groups, the smuggling of weapons, and the migration of refugees. There are other militant groups that work in more than one country and can use the weak state capacity and porous borders.

The regional forces seek strategic interests in Balochistan by using the proxy actors and competition over resources. These are the international aspects that interact with local grievances and form multifaceted terrorism ecosystems that combine local political grievances with regional geopolitical disputes.

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The relative deprivation theory is based on the idea that people can be compared in terms of deprivation, and the level of relative deprivation exerts a more significant impact than the absolute deprivation amount (Breckinridge, 2016). The relative deprivation theory has a premise that individuals can be ranked in terms of deprivation and that relative deprivation has a stronger effect than the absolute amount of deprivation (Breckinridge, 2016).

According to the Relative Deprivation Theory of Ted Robert Gurr (1972), the collective political violence occurs when the populations feel notified of significant discrepancies between anticipated resource allocations and present results. This disjunction creates resentments which, coupled with organizational potential and political opportunity structures, become violent mobilization.

3.1 Relative and Absolute Deprivation are Different

A population living in absolute poverty might not have the means to organize rebellion, or, on the contrary, a population that is facing unjust inequality against comparison groups will have more propensity to rebellion. Ethnopolitical upheavals among groups that are viewed as culturally or economically discriminated against are recorded by Ted Robert Gurr and Will Moore (1997), even though absolute living standards are moderate. This difference is why terrorism is not solely a phenomenon of the poorest countries but can also be found in the areas where there is a distributional imbalance in the richer states.

Relative deprivation in the situation of Baluchistan functions in two ways. To begin with, the Baloch people contrast their results of development with those of other provinces in Pakistan and see a lack of proper infrastructure, education, and healthcare despite the presence of natural resources. Second, the existence of regional parallels with the Baloch in Iran and Afghanistan creates the sense of unfair treatment by the state. These comparisons breed resentments that

perpetuate militant mobilization despite the fact that military operations have transient impacts of lowering organizational capacity.

3.2 Structural Violence Theory

The structural violence (Johan Galtung 1969) refers to the institutional structures that bring harm in the form of a lack of fulfillment of the basic needs. Structural violence causes pain in institutional structures, unlike direct violence, in which perpetrators and victims are needed; causation is hard to ascertain in structural violence. According to Galtung, structural violence comes before and causes direct violence; the only way to deal with direct violence is to break down structural setups.

Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman (1996) draw attention to the process of the normalization of structural violence that is integrated into everyday practices in institutions and cultural organizations. The structural violence in Balochistan occurs in the form of excluding development, marginalizing politics, and allocating resources to normalize provincial inequality. The result of these institutional structures is the creation of grievance and the delegitimization of state control, which creates an environment of terrorism as a form of resistance to perceived injustice.

According to Louise Arbour (2008), economic structural violence is especially important in political instability. Excluded groups discontented with the systematic discrimination suffered by certain regions or ethnic groups by economic institutions will come up with grievances that fuel organized opposition. Resource extraction institutions in Balochistan, which are organized to favor federal but not provincial governments, are a good example of structural violence that creates the propensity for terrorism.'

3.3 Terrorism Persistence Political Economy

According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004), the persistence of civil conflict is not merely a motivation, as it can be defined as an opportunity structure that allows the continuity of violence. Areas with extractive economies, weak institutions, and poor state capacity are some of the environments in which terrorist organizations work with little fear of interruption. Under these conditions, the presence of terrorism despite years of military counterterrorism depends.

Jonathan Goodhand (2004) discusses the war economies, demonstrating that institutional structures allow the violence entrepreneurs to enrich themselves at the cost of terrorism. In a scenario whereby weak government restricts other available livelihoods, terrorism becomes a cost-effective option for the marginalized groups. Institutional vulnerabilities of Balochistan, coupled with the natural resource endowment, form conditions where terrorism has played an economic role in addition to political ambitions.

David A. Lake (2003) examines how the lack of state capacity will lead to the need for alternative security solutions. The fact that the populations have a poor provision of state security might favor terrorist groups that offer protection and allocate resources. The inability of the state security apparatus in the peripheral regions of Baluchistan allowed militant groups to offer an alternative government and security services.

4 THE ANTECEDENTS OF TERRORISM IN BALOCHISTAN

The accession of Balochistan into Pakistan entailed a disputed accession. In comparison with the partition of the Hindu majority territories, Balochistan was first of all aimed at achieving independence and subsequently joined Pakistan in 1947 with its Khan of Kalat. This contentious membership brought historic resentment in terms of sovereign integration and political legitimacy.

The initial relations between states and society were characterized by centralization, in which provincial institutions were relegated to the federal authority. The overthrow of the National Awami Party (NAP) government in 1973 presented the readiness of federal authority to prevail over democracy in instances when provincial autonomy posed a danger to the central power. These political experiences defined the regimes of state suppression and democratic restriction that characterized the politics of the Balochistan economy.

4.1 Cycles of Insurgency and Militarized Responses

The initial large-scale insurgency against the state was the Baloch nationalist insurgency of 1973-1977, which was the first attempt at a significant armed opposition to the state. The government acted by deploying a large amount of military forces, forced migrations, and extrajudicial killings. This initial cycle set the trends of this strategy such that insurgency brought about militarization instead of political negotiation and institutional reform.

The insurgency that ensued after 2004 was a consolidated complaint of several decades. Dera Bugti (2005-2009) military operations resulted in a large-scale destruction of civilian life as well as displacement due to the separatist groups. These activities reinforced the views that the state was responding to political grievances by use of force against institutional accommodation. Hassan Abbas (2011) records the militarized reaction to insurgency, which failed to establish institutional political reforms, and continued rebels and repressions.

4.2 Political Marginalization and Governance Failures

4.2.1 Concentrated Power and Feeble Local Authority

The federalism of Pakistan is considered to have intact power among federal institutions and restricts the provincial autonomy in the administration of resources, formulation of policies, and allocation of expenditures. Muhammad Waseem (2010) examines federalism in Pakistan as structurally asymmetric, whereby power is concentrated in the federal agencies, and provinces are to execute their roles, but with no discretion in policy making. Such an organization implies that Baloch political leaders are not able to meet the demands of the constituents in terms of the equal distribution of resources or the priority of development. The discrepancy between the political responsibility and the real powers weakens the democratic legitimacy and creates grievances.

According to Stephen P. Cohen (2002), the weakness of democratic institutions and military superiority is the root of the governance crisis in Pakistan. Balochistan has its share of such failures in governance: the military forces continuously take precedence over the civilian government; the use of extra-judicial detentions and disappearances is frequent; provincial institutions are not equipped to perform proper governing duties. It is based on these institutional deficits that accretion of political grievances is present or absent in the presence or absence of institutional redress mechanisms.

4.2.2 Deniability of Political Representation and Decision-Making

In the Balochi society, political representation in the federal structure of Pakistan sidelined the Balochi society. Balochistan is under-represented by the National Assembly. Adeel Khan (2000) records the influence of ethnicity in Pakistan on political marginalization, with the peripheral ethnic groups excluded from the national decision-making processes. The more common practices against Baloch nationalist parties include electoral bans, arrests of leadership, and censorship. These political prohibitions deny institutional avenues of expressing grievances, turning frustrated populations to extra-institutional means such as terrorism.

Thomas Risse (2011) looks at the governance in those areas of limited statehood and how not being part of political processes creates support for non-state armed organizations that offer other governance services. Separatist groups in Balochistan offer social services, conflict resolution, and security to the population, services that the state does not offer. This institutional void allows terrorist groups to build political constituencies more than limited militant groups.

4.3 Socioeconomic Inequalities and Relative Deprivation

4.3.1 The Mining of Resources and Inequality of Development Results

Balochistan is endowed with large reserves of natural gas, copper, coal, and other mineral deposits, producing a lot of wealth from excavation. Nonetheless, the federal governments and international companies are the main beneficiaries of resource rents, and the extraction expenses affect the provincial population in terms of the environment and the human population. This arrangement is an example of structural violence put forward by Galtung: the institutional systems are structurally redistributing provincial resources to outside agents without corresponding provincial returns. In his book, S. Akbar Zaidi (2012) traces the political economy of underdevelopment in Balochistan and the way in which inequality is organized by resource extraction institutions. The industry of gas extraction brings the federal revenues of more than 2 billion dollars every year; however, Balochistan hardly gets the royalty and does not get sufficient investments to grow properly. Societies that reside by the sites of extraction often have no access to electricity, even though gas pipelines run through their lands. This sharp contrast between the process of resource extraction and development exclusion causes strong resentment.

According to Frederic Grare (2006), the development model of Pakistan has made it clear that the interests of Baluchistan do not take precedence over the federal strategic interests. The infrastructure development is not done on provincial public welfare but along the federal regions and resource mining areas. This trend can be described as the so-called war economies in which institutional policies favor elites at the expense of marginalized groups of people. Balanced grievance accumulation is the situation where populations feel they are being extracted without having their services or development in return.

4.3.2 Gaps between Poverty, Unemployment, and Human Development

Resource-endowed Balochistan has development indicators that are worse than those of other Pakistani provinces. The Human Development Index of the province is the lowest in the country; the level of literacy is greatly lower than the country's average; and the accessibility to infrastructure (electricity, clean water, healthcare) is lower than it is in parallel regions. These developmental gaps are manifested together with the evident extraction of resources and transfer of external wealth, which creates a perception of unequal resource allocation.

Unemployment, especially youth unemployment, is still high in Balochistan. The lack of educational opportunities limits the employment opportunities; the extraction industries do not hire many locals; and the employment of the government is also patronage-based and locks out the non-Baloch minorities. The unemployed young people who have less chance of obtaining opportunities through a legitimate opportunity structure are recruited by the militant groups through the provision of funds and an identity-defining community.

Haris Gazdar (2007) discusses the opportunities and issues of Baluchistan and suggests that issues of poverty, unemployment, and the lack of human development are associated with political violence. Political rejection is coupled with economic marginalization to create wholesale complaints towards state institutions. The mobilization of terrorism

is easiest when it comes to young generations who cannot find any legitimate avenues of economic development and political representation.

4.4 Identity, Nationalism, and Cultural Grievances

4.4.1 Baloch Ethnicity and the History of Resistance

Baloch nationalism was historically developed due to the growth of ethnic self-identification and historical accounts that set the Baloch as a separate nation oppressed by the Pakistani state. Baloch nationalists insisted on language uniqueness, cultural customs, and historical political self-governing before the establishment of Pakistan. These identity signs offered resistance agendas and models.

Ian Talbot (2008) records the political history of Balochistan, which reveals the development of Baloch nationalism in colonial and post-colonial times as a response to the perceived foreign domination. The further strengthening of the Baloch ethnic consciousness and the nationalistic mobilization were a result of state integration activities, such as forced assimilation policies and language suppression. All these grievances, which are based on identity, plus political exclusion, produced influential drivers of terrorism mobilization.

4.4.2 Cultural Marginalization and Having of Political Expression

This suppression of Baloch nationalist politics by the state created the feeling of discontent with cultural recognition and autonomy in politics. The education of the Baloch language was kept at a minimum; the media did not represent the Baloch views; the nationalist political parties could be periodically banned.

Often, state security agencies targeted Baloch intellectual and political leadership by arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and killing them. Those practices served to show Baloch people that the political expression was existentially threatened, which could even explain the armed self-defense discourses that terrorist groups used to mobilize people. The phenomenon of human rights violations in the counterterrorism actions of Pakistan is recorded by Samina Ahmed (2004), who demonstrates how infractions of security forces created discontent, leading to the development of grievances regarding the recruitment of terrorists.

5 CENTER-PERIPHERY RESOURCE DYNAMICS AND RENEWED GRIEVANCE ACCUMULATION

5.1 The Extraction Arrangements of Resources

The extraction arrangements of resources institutionalize center-periphery inequality by means of the structuring of grievance perpetuation. The federal government is involved in the extraction licensing of resources, the setting of royalties, and the environmental management of the extraction sites without any substantial involvement of the provincial governments. The consequence of this institutional framework is that despite counterterrorism military success, the causes of grievance keep reemerging and growing.

Akbar Zaidi (2012) shows that the extraction of resources favourably impacts the federal governments and foreign corporations disproportionately, whereas the peripheral regions incur the environmental cost without equivalent economic advantages. This institutional structure remains intact even in the face of security operations against extractive infrastructure; institutional political reform rather than military force can bring about a change in extraction arrangements. Therefore, the terrorism against the extraction infrastructure and federal interests re-emerges as a repetitive occurrence due to the presence of institutional grievances that go unaddressed.

5.2 Governance failures and Marginalization by Institutions

The failure in governance creates perpetuation of terrorism in several ways. Weak state capacity facilitates the delivery of security, resolution of disputes, and social services by the terrorist groups, which builds constituencies that stretch beyond tiny militant groups. Weak judicial systems see grievance piling up without the redress of the institutions. Insecurity and administrative institution corruption form a setback in adopting state legitimacy and serve to inform marginalized people that formal institutions are a means of protecting the interests of elites and not the interests of people.

Moeed Yusuf (2014) records the interaction between counterterrorism and the failure of governance in Pakistan. The civilians are the victims and displaced in security operations by institutions that do not have accountability measures, generating new grievances advanced by terrorism recruitment. The abuse of security forces by a given population makes them attracted to terrorist rhetoric that defines the state as an existential threat, which justifies armed retaliation. Unless the institution is governed by reforms that strongly deal with accountability and legitimacy, military action leads to grievances that surpass the number of casualties caused to terrorist groups.

5.3 Security-development Trade-offs and Counterproductive Consequences

Counterterrorism methods that are security-exclusive create unintended effects in the continuance of terrorism. The movements of armed forces cause civilian displacement, economic life, and social organization of the population, arrests of perceived militants anger families and ethnic groups, and security checkpoints curtail movement, preventing economic opportunity and normal life with its daily routine.

In an analysis of security sector reform in Pakistan, Mark Sedra (2009) demonstrates that the security institutions that are run by the military focus on tactical counterterrorism (rather than institutional development) that addresses structural terrorism drivers. In situations where the policy balance in counterterrorism is largely dominated by security activities where development and governance reforms lack sufficient resources, the drivers of terrorism remain in place. The outcome is a long-term conflict with a low strategic win since military operations are used to treat the symptoms and not the causes.

V. R. Raghavan (2004) discusses counterinsurgency in South Asia and states that the persistence of insurgency is the lack of interest in the political grievance and institutional reforms. Military interventions that do not have political settlement structures only postpone insurgency but do not end it. In Balochistan, the decades-long history of military action and lack of political accommodation manifests this trend: insurgency is not responsive to the deployment of security forces, which reveals the ineffectiveness of military action without the change of the institution.

6 CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM IN BALOCHISTAN

6.1 Direct Violence and Casualties

Terrorism has been breeding significant casualties, displacement, and trauma in Balochistan province. Suicide bombings have also been used to kill civilians and combatants against security forces, infrastructure projects, and ethnic minorities. Sectarian assaults on Hazara communities can be regarded as especially extreme outcomes of the terrorist relations in Balochistan. Counterterrorism operations, though aimed at defeating the terrorists, have led to civilians being killed, displacement, and the destruction of infrastructure.

6.2 Socioeconomic Consequences

Terrorism has economic effects that go beyond actual violence. Insecurity discourages investment and restricts the growth of an economy and job prospects. Fear inhibits the mobility of people and curtails market penetration and economic involvement. Extraction industries and the transportation system fall victim to infrastructure targeting, which slows down economic production. Such economic after impacts continue to promote poverty and unemployment, which again contribute to the recruitment of terrorists by marginalized youth with economically disadvantaged backgrounds.

6.3 Political Implications and Relations between the State and Citizens

In Balochistan, the state's legitimacy is harmed by terrorism and counterterrorism activities. The lack of accountability of the state institutions through security force abuses, arbitrary detention, and disappearance is a sign that delegitimizes state authority in the eyes of the marginalized people. When the populations perceive state security forces as an enemy or foreigners causing harm, the power of the state decays, and the alternative rule gradually seems to be better with the help of terrorist organizations.

Long-term terrorism creates political polarization, whereby there is a growing division between those who advocate for military counter-terrorism and those who condemn the abuse of the security forces. This polarization makes it difficult to solve conflicts because compromise will be seen by both extremists on security measures and terrorism victims under state violence as betrayal.

7 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Resource Governance Reform

To handle the issue of terrorism persistence, there is a need to reorganize resource extraction arrangements to benefit the provinces fairly. The federal government needs to raise provincial resource royalties to the extraction cost and value transfer levels. The provincial governments are supposed to be involved in the decision on extraction licensing, environmental and development planning of the extractive regions.

Reform implementation should be informed by the international best practices in resource governance. The countries that can manage extractive industries successfully tend to see the producing regions enjoy considerable resource rents and be involved in making extraction decisions. Similar arrangements in Balochistan would solve the underlying structural violence that creates terrorism, creating grievances.

7.2 Reform of the Institutional Development and Federalism

The federal system in Pakistan needs reform to allow the autonomy of the provinces and, at the same time, national unity. The constitutional changes are related to the improvement of the provincial legal control over resource management, the development priorities, and the coordination of security operations. An increase in the proportion of revenue to the provincial governments should also be a controlled measure, allowing the policy to be chosen instead of issuing directives from the federal government.

The democratic institutions should be reinforced so that the provincial voice can be heard in the development of national policies. Reform in the Senate must have an increase in representation of provinces; reforms in the National

Assembly must have proportionality of representation through demographics. As provincial citizens attain real political representation in the decision-making processes of the country, they have an institutionalized outlet through which to voice their grievances, which minimizes the need to mobilize terrorism.

7.3 Planning and Human Capital Investment

The company plans to invest in its human capital to ensure the accomplishment of its objectives. Poverty and unemployment can only be resolved by investing heavily in development in Balochistan in terms of education, healthcare, infrastructure, and the creation of economic opportunities. The government should invest in the diversification of the economy that is not based on extractive industries and cannot be employed by outside forces. Investment in education has to be put on the highest agenda, as education has been found to be associated with decreased vulnerability to terrorism recruitment and increased access to legitimate opportunities. The review of the technical and vocational training programs must also be linked to the employment opportunities so that young people can leave their training education and move to an effective job.

7.4 Security Force Accountability and Protection of Human Rights

When it comes to dealing with terrorism, it is important that the security forces be under the legal accountability provisions that prevent misuse. Prosecutor punishment of abusive officers, transparent investigations of the cases, and independent complaint mechanisms would indicate that the state is committed to the rule of law and the protection of human rights. People have state institutions as enemies when security forces act with impunity, and then terrorism discourses of armed self-defense become possible.

Bans on torture, limitations on maximum time of detention, and habeas corpus would limit the power of security forces and show the willingness of the state to uphold human rights. Monitoring of human rights and transparency mechanisms on an international scale would increase accountability and create a signal of the seriousness of states in regard to reform.

7.5 Integrated Development-Security Programming

Successful counterterrorism must be based on the combination of security operations with the development and institutional reform programming. The military actions that should be mandatory are those aimed at countering urgent terrorist threats, but the development efforts at eliminating terrorism drivers should also be directed. The violence caused by security operations alone, without institutional reform and development, causes more grievances than terrorist casualties generated, thus perpetuating violence in the long term.

The security force should be trained on the importance of civilian protection and respect of human rights; development programs should be focused on areas that have always been marginalized; the institution of democracy should be developed to ensure the right to participate in politics; and transitional justice mechanisms should be established to confront historical grievances.

8 CONCLUSION

The continuity of terrorism in Balochistan is not only the manifestation of the tactical failure of the military forces but also the result of the structural lack of resources, institutions, and parties in the state. Although warfare can deal with terrorist threats that exist today, structural conditions that breed terrorism incentives have not been reduced significantly despite decades of counterterrorism efforts. In the analysis contained in the paper, it was found that terrorist violence in Baluchistan is rooted in institutional frameworks that concentrate resource benefits at the federal level and allocate extraction cost to provincial people; systems of governance that deny the Baloch political representation in the national decision-making process; and paradigms of development that has left the peripheral regions of the country with much to be desired in terms of resource endowment.

The conceptual framework of Relative Deprivation Theory and Structural Violence Theory combines to explain how the institutional structure creates and maintains terrorism-based grievances. Populations that are likely to feel that there exist huge disparities between projected and achieved allocations of resources, and when the institutional processes fail to provide a means of redressing grievances through a democratic process, violence is an option for expressing discontent and achieving political goals.

Modern terrorism within Balochistan is a logical reaction to structural exclusion and institutional marginalization of the state, instead of the direct devotion to jihadism or the abstract nationalist division. This insight indicates that terrorism will keep on persisting without institutional reforms on the structural underlying conditions. The military counterterrorism activities, being tactical in the short-term reduction of threats, are not a strategic measure to long-term sustainability of security without institutional building.

The political policy implication is obvious: to solve the problem of terrorism, security operations should be combined with an institutional change. The reorganization of resource governance that guarantees fair provincial benefit, the reform of federalism that empowers the provinces to operate autonomously and engage in democracy, large-scale

investment in development that will reduce poverty and unemployment, and security force accountability procedures that will prevent exploitation all compose key elements of an all-encompassing counterterrorism strategy.

The history of dealing with terrorism and conflict across countries reveals that the deployment of military interventions is seldom the best way to sustain peace until political grievances and institutional shortcomings are addressed. The policy of Pakistan towards Balochistan should be transformed to be an integrated development-security programming, as terrorism perpetration is an expression of governance failures and institutional marginalization that can be solved through political solutions in addition to security operations.

Further studies need to elaborate such an analysis to test certain institutional reform pathways, regional comparisons to other resource-endowed peripheral areas that share similar conflicts, and longitudinal research on changes in patterns of terrorism post the introduction of institutional reforms. Further, a study incorporating the views of security forces on the issue of institutional reform and elite political economy aspects, which restrict reform implementation, would help enlighten real-world impediments to the implementation of policies.

The same level of conclusion would be that sustainable terrorism reduction in Balochistan would involve the need to extend beyond security-only paradigms of thinking to the development of a wholesome institutional response to structural violence, political marginalization, and inequity in resource governance. It is only under such elaborate ways that Pakistan can experience a lasting security and placate the valid grievances behind the continuous terrorism of Balochistan.

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