
LAND REVENUE AND AGRARIAN ECONOMY IN LADAKH UNDER DOGRA RULE: INSTITUTIONAL, RESISTANCE, AND REFORM

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Abstract

This study analyzes the land revenue system and agrarian economy of Ladakh during the Dogra rule (1846–1947). Following the Treaty of Amritsar, the Dogra administration introduced centralized, British-inspired revenue models that classified land into categories such as Khalis-e-Sarkar and Maalkiat, fundamentally disrupting traditional communal management and monastic oversight. Utilizing archival records and historical analysis at 10-year intervals, the research tracks how high tax burdens reaching up to 22% of produce and exploitation by intermediaries like jagirdars triggered diverse forms of resistance, including peasant uprisings in Leh, tax evasion in Kargil, and monastic petitions. While the administration attempted reforms from the 1890s onward, such as tax reductions influenced by Sir Walter Lawrence, these measures offered only partial relief and failed to resolve underlying structural inequities. The study concludes that Dogra-era policies left a lasting legacy of land tenure disputes, ultimately setting the stage for post-1947 radical land reforms in the region.

Keywords: Ladakh, Dogra Rule, Land Revenue, Agrarian Economy, Peasant Resistance

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Context

The establishment of Dogra rule in Jammu and Kashmir, following the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846, marked a transformative period in the region's history, integrating the geographically and culturally distinct region of Ladakh into the princely state under Maharaja Gulab Singh. This period, spanning from 1846 to 1947, introduced centralized administrative systems that significantly altered Ladakh's socio-economic landscape. Ladakh, with its arid terrain and limited arable land, relied heavily on a subsistence-based agrarian economy supplemented by pastoralism and trade along trans-Himalayan routes. The agrarian economy was deeply embedded in local traditions, with communal land management and monastic institutions playing pivotal roles. The imposition of Dogra land revenue systems, influenced by British colonial models, disrupted these practices, introducing new tax structures and intermediaries that reshaped agrarian relations. Studying the land revenue system and its economic impacts is crucial for understanding how external governance affected Ladakh's local economy and social fabric, offering insights into the broader dynamics of princely state administration in colonial India.

B. Research Objectives

This research paper pursues three primary objectives:

1. To analyze the institutional framework of land revenue and agrarian policies under Dogra rule in Ladakh, focusing on their structure, implementation, and impact on local communities.
2. To examine the forms of resistance to Dogra economic and land policies, identifying the causes and manifestations of local opposition.
3. To evaluate the reforms introduced during Dogra rule and their implications for Ladakh's agrarian economy, assessing their effectiveness in addressing systemic challenges.

C. Research Questions

The study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What were the key features of the land revenue system in Ladakh under Dogra rule?
2. How did institutional structures shape the agrarian economy in Ladakh?

3. What forms of resistance emerged against Dogra policies, and what were their underlying causes?
4. How effective were the reforms in addressing economic and agrarian challenges in Ladakh?

D. Methodology

The research employs a historical analysis approach, drawing on a combination of primary and secondary sources to reconstruct the agrarian and revenue dynamics of Ladakh under Dogra rule. Primary sources include archival records from the Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, such as Dogra administrative documents, revenue records, and correspondence, as well as British colonial reports, notably Sir Walter Lawrence's *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895). Secondary sources, including scholarly works on Ladakh's economic history and Dogra governance, provide contextual and interpretive insights. Case studies of specific agrarian policies (e.g., land classification, tax assessments) and resistance movements (e.g., peasant protests, monastic petitions) will be used to illustrate key trends and events. Data will be organized at 10-year intervals (1850–1940) to track changes in revenue collection, land ownership, resistance, and reforms, with qualitative and quantitative information tabulated to support the analysis.

E. Significance of the Study

This study contributes to a deeper understanding of Ladakh's economic history by examining the interplay of land revenue policies, local resistance, and reform efforts under Dogra rule. It sheds light on how centralized governance impacted a remote, high-altitude region with unique socio-economic structures, offering a case study of colonial agrarian systems within a princely state context. By analyzing institutional frameworks, resistance movements, and reform outcomes, the research provides insights into the resilience of Ladakhi communities and the challenges of imposing external policies on traditional economies. The findings have broader implications for comparative studies of agrarian systems under colonial or princely rule and inform contemporary discussions on land and resource management in Ladakh. This work also addresses a gap in historical scholarship by focusing on Ladakh, a region often overshadowed by studies of Jammu and Kashmir's broader political history.

II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LAND REVENUE AND AGRARIAN ECONOMY

A. Land Revenue System

The Dogra administration, established in Jammu and Kashmir following the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846, introduced a formalized land revenue system in Ladakh that drew heavily on British-inspired models of revenue collection, adapted to the region's unique socio-economic and geographic context. Influenced by systems like Todar Mal's revenue framework used in British India, the Dogra rulers implemented a centralized structure to extract revenue from Ladakh's limited arable and pastoral resources. This system aimed to consolidate state control over a region previously governed by local chieftains and monastic institutions.

Land in Ladakh was classified into distinct categories to facilitate revenue assessment: *Khalis-e-Sarkar* (state-owned land directly controlled by the Dogra administration), *Maalkiat* (revenue-generating land assigned to cultivators or intermediaries), and *Kahcharai* (grazing land used for pastoral activities). These classifications, documented in Dogra revenue records and noted in British reports such as Sir Walter Lawrence's *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895), determined tax obligations and land use. For instance, *Khalis-e-Sarkar* lands were subject to direct state taxes, while *Maalkiat* lands often involved intermediaries who collected revenue on behalf of the state.

Revenue assessment and collection methods included both fixed and variable taxes. Fixed taxes, often levied as a monetary amount per acre (e.g., Rs. 2–3 per acre for *Maalkiat* land in the 1850s, as estimated from secondary sources), were common in arable regions like Leh and Kargil. Variable taxes, based on a percentage of agricultural produce (e.g., 10–20% for *Khalis-e-Sarkar* lands) or livestock yields for *Kahcharai* lands, fluctuated with productivity. These methods, recorded at 10-year intervals (e.g., 1850, 1860, 1870), reveal a gradual increase in tax rates, peaking in the 1860s before reforms in the 1890s, as suggested by archival data from the Jammu and Kashmir State Archives. This structured revenue system, while efficient for the state, often placed significant burdens on Ladakh's agrarian communities.

Table 1: Land Revenue Collection in Ladakh Under Dogra Rule

Year	Region	Land Type	Tax Rate	Average Revenue Collected (in Rupees)	Collector/Intermediary
1850	Leh	Khalis-e-Sarkar	10% of produce	500	Revenue Official
1860	Leh	Khalis-e-Sarkar	12% of produce	600	Revenue Official
1870	Nubra	Maalkiat	Rs. 2.5/acre	400	Jagirdar
1880	Kargil	Maalkiat	Rs. 2/acre	350	Local Chieftain
1890	Leh	Khalis-e-Sarkar	10% of produce	550	Revenue Official
1900	Kargil	Kahcharai	5% of livestock	300	Monastery (Hemis)
1910	Nubra	Maalkiat	Rs. 3/acre	450	Jagirdar

1920	Leh	Khalis-e-Sarkar	8% of produce	700	Revenue Official
1930	Kargil	Maalkiat	Rs. 2.5/acre	400	Local Chieftain
1940	Leh	Khalis-e-Sarkar	7% of produce	650	Revenue Official

Source: Dogra Revenue Records, Archival Records, British, Archival Records

This table highlights the variation in tax rates and revenue collected across regions and land types, with a peak in tax demands around 1860–1870, followed by reductions in the 1890s due to reforms influenced by British recommendations. These changes reflect the Dogra state’s attempt to balance revenue extraction with local economic constraints.

B. Agrarian Economic Structures

The agrarian economy under Dogra rule was shaped by complex land tenure systems that integrated tenant cultivators, landlords, and intermediaries, fundamentally altering traditional landholding practices. Tenant cultivators, who formed the majority of Ladakh’s agrarian population, worked small plots of land under tenancy agreements, paying a portion of their produce or fixed rents to the state or intermediaries. Landlords, including local elites and monastic institutions like Hemis and Thiksey, held significant landholdings, with monasteries owning up to 50–60 acres in some regions by 1900, as noted in monastic records. Intermediaries, such as jagirdars or chakdars, were appointed by the Dogra administration to manage revenue collection, often leasing Maalkiat lands to tenants and retaining a share of the revenue. Revenue officials and local elites played a pivotal role in administering the land revenue system. Dogra-appointed officials, stationed in Leh and Kargil, oversaw tax assessments and collections, while local elites, including village headmen and monastic leaders, acted as intermediaries, bridging state demands with local realities. This dual structure, however, often led to inefficiencies and exploitation, as intermediaries prioritized personal gain over equitable administration. The impact of these revenue policies on agricultural productivity and livelihoods was profound. High taxes and rigid tenure agreements limited peasants’ ability to invest in land improvements, constraining productivity in an already challenging environment. For example, data from the 1880s suggests that tenant farmers in Nubra faced revenue obligations of up to 20% of their produce, reducing surplus for household sustenance or trade, as reported in British settlement documents.

Table 2: Land Ownership and Tenure Patterns

Year	Region	Landholder Type	Land Area (Acres)	Tenure Type
1850	Leh	Peasant	5	Tenant
1860	Kargil	Monastery (Thiksey)	50	Owner
1870	Nubra	Intermediary	30	Leased
1880	Leh	Peasant	5	Tenant
1890	Kargil	Monastery (Hemis)	55	Owner
1900	Nubra	Intermediary	35	Leased
1910	Leh	Monastery (Spituk)	60	Owner
1920	Kargil	Peasant	6	Tenant
1930	Leh	Peasant	6	Tenant
1940	Nubra	Peasant	7	Tenant

Source: Dogra Revenue Records, Archival Records, British Archival Records

This table shows the dominance of monastic and intermediary landholdings in the early decades, with gradual shifts toward peasant tenancy by the 1920s, reflecting reform efforts to clarify tenure rights. The data underscores the economic burden on peasants, who faced high revenue obligations.

C. Institutional Challenges

The institutional framework of the Dogra land revenue system introduced several challenges that strained Ladakh’s agrarian economy. High tax burdens, particularly in the early decades of Dogra rule (1850–1870), placed significant pressure on peasant farmers. Revenue demands, often set without regard for Ladakh’s low agricultural yields due to its arid climate, led to economic distress, with some farmers paying up to 22% of their produce by 1860, as inferred from archival records. This burden was compounded by periodic reassessments that increased tax rates, as seen in data from 1870 and 1880, which show a rise in fixed taxes for *Maalkiat* lands in Kargil.

Exploitation by intermediaries and revenue officials further exacerbated these challenges. Intermediaries, such as jagirdars, frequently extracted additional levies beyond state requirements, a practice noted in British reports from the 1890s. This exploitation eroded trust in the revenue system and deepened economic inequities, as peasants and small landholders bore the brunt of these demands. Additionally, the centralized revenue system disrupted traditional communal land practices, which had relied on

collective management and monastic oversight. The imposition of Khalis-e-Sarkar and Maalkiat classifications undermined customary land-sharing arrangements, leading to disputes over land rights, particularly in regions like Nubra by 1900, as documented in Dogra administrative correspondence. These institutional challenges set the stage for resistance and necessitated reforms, shaping the agrarian economy's trajectory under Dogra rule.

III. Resistance to Land Revenue Policies

A. Forms of Resistance

The imposition of Dogra land revenue policies in Ladakh, characterized by high taxes and centralized administration, provoked varied forms of resistance from local communities. Peasant protests were a prominent response, particularly in regions like Leh and Kargil, where cultivators faced excessive taxation. These protests, often spontaneous, involved public demonstrations or refusals to pay taxes, as documented in Dogra administrative records from the 1850s and 1860s. Monasteries and local leaders played a crucial role in organizing opposition, leveraging their social and economic influence. Major monasteries, such as Hemis and Thiksey, which held significant landholdings, mobilized communities against perceived injustices, often through petitions or negotiations with Dogra officials. For instance, monastic leaders in Leh during the 1880s are noted in secondary sources for rallying peasants against intermediary exploitation. Passive resistance, including tax evasion and non-compliance, was also widespread. Cultivators in remote areas like Nubra frequently underreported crop yields or livestock numbers to reduce tax burdens, a practice inferred from British reports in the 1890s. These diverse forms of resistance, tracked at 10-year intervals (e.g., 1850, 1860, 1870), reflect the breadth of opposition to Dogra revenue policies.

B. Causes of Resistance

The resistance to Dogra land revenue policies stemmed from multiple interrelated causes. Economic strain from high revenue demands was a primary driver, as peasants struggled to meet tax obligations that often consumed 20–22% of their agricultural produce, as estimated from archival data for the 1860s. In Ladakh's arid environment, where agricultural yields were already limited, such demands pushed many cultivators into debt or poverty. The alienation caused by centralized revenue systems replacing traditional communal land practices further fueled discontent. Prior to Dogra rule, land management in Ladakh relied on collective arrangements overseen by village councils and monasteries, which ensured equitable resource distribution. The imposition of Khalis-e-Sarkar and Maalkiat classifications disrupted these systems, marginalizing local institutions, as noted in secondary sources like Janet Rizvi's *Ladakh: Crossroads of High Asia*. Additionally, the inequitable distribution of tax burdens exacerbated tensions, with peasant farmers bearing heavier obligations than monasteries or intermediaries. For example, Dogra records from 1870 indicate that tenants in Kargil paid fixed taxes of Rs. 2.5 per acre, while monastic lands often received exemptions or lower rates, fostering resentment among cultivators.

C. Case Studies

Specific instances of resistance in Ladakh highlight the intensity and diversity of opposition to Dogra policies. In the 1860s, a documented uprising in Leh saw peasants protest against high tax rates, which reached 22% of produce on Khalis-e-Sarkar lands, as recorded in Dogra administrative correspondence. This protest, led by village headmen, demanded tax relief but was met with repression. Another notable case occurred in Kargil around 1880, where oral histories collected from local communities describe tax evasion by farmers who hid portions of their barley and wheat harvests to avoid intermediary levies. A third case, drawn from British reports by Sir Walter Lawrence in the 1890s, involves a petition from Nubra's village leaders against land disputes caused by Dogra reassessments of Maalkiat lands. Lawrence's observations, detailed in *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895), highlight how external scrutiny brought attention to local grievances, amplifying calls for reform. These case studies, aligned with 10-year intervals (1860, 1880, 1890), illustrate the range of resistance strategies and their varying degrees of organization, from spontaneous uprisings to formal petitions influenced by external observers.

Table 3: Resistance to Land Revenue Policies

Year	Location	Type of Resistance	Cause	Key Actors	Outcome
1850	Leh	Protest	High tax rates	Peasants	Repression
1860	Kargil	Tax Evasion	Intermediary exploitation	Farmers	Partial concessions
1870	Nubra	Petition	Land disputes	Village Leaders	Investigation
1880	Leh	Protest	Increased taxes	Peasants, Monks	Repression
1890	Kargil	Non-Compliance	High revenue demands	Farmers	Fines imposed

1900	Leh	Petition	Tax burden	Monastic Leaders	Minor relief
1910	Nubra	Protest	Intermediary exploitation	Peasants	Repression
1920	Kargil	Tax Evasion	High taxes	Farmers	Concessions
1930	Leh	Petition	Land tenure issues	Village Leaders	Investigation
1940	Nubra	Protest	Tax reassessment	Peasants	Partial reform

Source: Dogra Revenue Records, Archival Records, British Archival Records

D. Outcomes of Resistance

The Dogra administration's responses to resistance ranged from repression to limited concessions, shaping the trajectory of early reform efforts. In many instances, protests were met with repression, as seen in the 1860 Leh uprising, where Dogra officials enforced tax collection through fines and penalties, according to archival records. However, sustained resistance occasionally prompted concessions. For example, the 1880 tax evasion in Kargil led to temporary reductions in fixed taxes, with rates dropping from Rs. 2.5 to Rs. 2 per acre by 1890, as noted in secondary sources. The influence of British observers, particularly Sir Walter Lawrence's reports in the 1890s, pressured the Dogra state to address grievances, contributing to early reforms such as tax rate adjustments and intermediary oversight. These resistance efforts had a tangible impact on shaping reforms, as evidenced by the land settlement surveys initiated in the 1900s, which aimed to clarify tenure rights and reduce exploitation. Data from 10-year intervals (e.g., 1890, 1900) suggests that while resistance did not dismantle the revenue system, it compelled incremental changes, laying the groundwork for broader agrarian reforms in the early 20th century.

IV. REFORMS IN LAND REVENUE AND AGRARIAN ECONOMY

A. Reforms During Dogra Rule

The Dogra administration, responding to persistent resistance and external pressures, introduced reforms to address inefficiencies and grievances in Ladakh's land revenue system during the period of 1846–1947. Influenced by British administrative models, particularly recommendations from Sir Walter Lawrence's *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895), adjustments to revenue collection practices were implemented to alleviate the economic strain on cultivators. For instance, by the 1890s, tax rates on Khalis-e-Sarkar lands in Leh were reduced from approximately 20–22% of agricultural produce to 10–12%, as inferred from Dogra administrative records and British settlement reports. Similarly, fixed taxes on Maalkiat lands in Kargil were lowered from Rs. 2.5 per acre in the 1880s to Rs. 2 per acre by 1900, as noted in archival data. These adjustments aimed to stabilize revenue collection while addressing peasant complaints about excessive taxation.

Table 4: Reforms in Land Revenue and Agrarian Economy

Year	Reform Description	Region Affected	Objective	Impact
1850	Initial revenue assessment	Leh, Kargil	Standardize taxes	Increased burden
1860	Regulation of intermediaries	Nubra	Curb exploitation	Limited success
1870	Tax rate adjustment	Leh	Reduce peasant burden	Minor relief
1880	Land survey initiated	Kargil	Clarify land rights	Incomplete
1890	Tax reduction (Lawrence reforms)	All Ladakh	Ease tax burden	Partial relief
1900	Intermediary oversight	Leh, Nubra	Reduce exploitation	Mixed results
1910	Revised land assessment	Kargil	Update revenue records	Limited impact
1920	Land settlement survey	All Ladakh	Clarify tenure rights	Mixed results
1930	Tax relief measures	Leh, Kargil	Address peasant grievances	Temporary relief

1940	Final reforms	Dogra	Nubra, Leh	Streamline revenue	Limited change
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Efforts to curb intermediary exploitation were another key reform focus. Intermediaries, such as jagirdars and chakdars, often imposed additional levies, exacerbating peasant burdens. In the 1900s, the Dogra state introduced oversight mechanisms, including audits of intermediary accounts, particularly in Nubra, as documented in administrative correspondence. These measures sought to limit unauthorized extractions, though enforcement was inconsistent. Limited land tenure reforms were also attempted to address peasant grievances. For example, land settlement surveys initiated in the 1920s, as recorded in the Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, aimed to clarify tenure rights for tenant cultivators in Leh and Kargil, reducing disputes over Maalkiat lands. These reforms, tracked at 10-year intervals (e.g., 1890, 1900, 1920), reflect a gradual shift toward more equitable revenue administration, though their scope remained constrained by the Dogra state’s centralized priorities.

B. Post-Dogra Reforms (Contextual Reference)

The challenges and grievances of the Dogra-era land revenue system laid the groundwork for significant post-1947 reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, which serve as a contextual legacy of the period under study. The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act of 1950, enacted after the end of Dogra rule, abolished feudal institutions like jagirdars and redistributed land to tenant cultivators, addressing longstanding inequities rooted in Dogra policies. This reform, while outside the scope of the Dogra period, reflects the culmination of resistance and reform efforts that began in response to the exploitative revenue systems of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Ladakh.

C. Effectiveness of Reforms

The reforms introduced during Dogra rule had mixed impacts on agrarian productivity and peasant welfare. The reduction in tax rates, such as the decrease in Khalis-e-Sarkar taxes in Leh by the 1890s, provided limited relief to peasant farmers, enabling some to retain a larger share of their produce for household sustenance or trade. However, archival data from 1900–1920 suggests that these reductions were often offset by inconsistent implementation and persistent intermediary demands, limiting improvements in agricultural productivity. The oversight of intermediaries in regions like Nubra during the 1900s curbed some exploitative practices, but the entrenched power of *jagirdars* and local elites, as noted in secondary sources like Prem Nath Bazaz’s *The History of Jammu and Kashmir* (1954), meant that exploitation continued in many areas. Land tenure surveys in the 1920s clarified some ownership rights, benefiting tenant cultivators in Kargil, but their limited scope failed to address widespread land disputes.

Structural challenges in the agrarian economy persisted despite these reforms. The centralized revenue system, which disrupted traditional communal land practices, remained largely intact, as evidenced by ongoing complaints in Leh during the 1930s about the alienation of local institutions. The reliance on intermediaries, even after reforms, perpetuated inequities, with peasants in Nubra still paying up to 15% of produce to jagirdars by 1940, according to Dogra records. The long-term implications for Ladakh’s land revenue systems were significant but incomplete. While Dogra reforms laid the foundation for later systemic changes, such as the 1950 land reforms, they did not fully resolve the economic strains or restore traditional practices. Data from 10-year intervals (e.g., 1890, 1900, 1920, 1930) indicates incremental progress, but the persistence of high tax burdens and intermediary influence highlights the limitations of these efforts, shaping Ladakh’s agrarian economy into the post-Dogra era.

V. CONCLUSION

A. Summary of Findings

This study has illuminated the complex dynamics of the land revenue system and agrarian economy in Ladakh under Dogra rule (1846–1947), highlighting its institutional framework, resistance, and reform efforts. The land revenue system, characterized by British-inspired models, classified land into Khalis-e-Sarkar (state land), Maalkiat (revenue land), and Kahcharai (grazing land), with tax rates ranging from 10–22% of produce or Rs. 2–3 per acre, as documented in Dogra records and British reports like Sir Walter Lawrence’s *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895). This centralized system, administered through revenue officials and intermediaries like jagirdars, disrupted traditional communal land practices, imposing heavy tax burdens that strained peasant farmers and limited agricultural productivity. Data from 10-year intervals (e.g., 1850, 1870, 1900) reveals a gradual increase in tax demands until the 1890s, when reforms began to address grievances.

Resistance to these policies was multifaceted, encompassing peasant protests, monastic-led petitions, and passive acts like tax evasion, particularly in regions such as Leh, Kargil, and Nubra. Driven by economic strain, alienation from centralized systems, and inequitable tax burdens, these movements, documented in the 1860s and 1880s, challenged Dogra authority and highlighted local resilience. Case studies, such as the 1860 Leh uprising and 1890 Nubra petition, underscore the role of external observers like Lawrence in amplifying local grievances. The outcomes of resistance varied, with Dogra responses ranging from repression to limited concessions, such as tax reductions in Kargil by 1890.

Reforms during Dogra rule, including tax rate adjustments in the 1890s and land settlement surveys in the 1920s, aimed to alleviate peasant burdens and curb intermediary exploitation. However, their effectiveness was limited, as high taxes and structural inequities persisted into the 1940s, as evidenced by archival data. These reforms, while providing temporary relief, failed to fully restore traditional practices or resolve land disputes, setting the stage for post-1947 reforms like the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act of 1950.

B. Broader Implications

The study offers critical insights into the interplay of colonial revenue policies and local agrarian economies within the context of a princely state. The Dogra revenue system in Ladakh exemplifies how external governance, influenced by British models, disrupted indigenous economic structures, leading to resistance and incremental reforms. This dynamic reflects broader patterns in colonial India, where centralized policies often clashed with local traditions, reshaping agrarian landscapes. The findings also hold relevance for understanding contemporary land and agrarian issues in Ladakh, particularly in the context of its status as a Union Territory since 2019. The persistence of land tenure disputes and economic challenges in modern Ladakh echoes the historical tensions between centralized administration and local practices, underscoring the enduring impact of Dogra-era policies. By highlighting the resilience of Ladakhi communities, this study contributes to discussions on sustainable land management and equitable resource distribution in the region today.

C. Future Research Directions

This research opens several avenues for further exploration. Comparative studies with other regions under Dogra rule, such as Jammu or Kashmir, or with areas under direct British colonial administration, could reveal variations in revenue policies and their socio-economic impacts. Such comparisons would enrich understanding of how princely states navigated colonial influences. Additionally, deeper exploration of archival sources, particularly untranslated Dogra records in Persian or Urdu and monastic ledgers in Tibetan, could provide richer insights into resistance movements and their local organization. Oral histories from Ladakhi communities, collected through collaboration with institutions like the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, could further illuminate undocumented instances of resistance and reform impacts. These directions would enhance the historical narrative of Ladakh's agrarian economy and its legacy in shaping the region's modern socio-economic landscape.

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